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Delaware’s Balancing Act
JOHN ARMOUR, BERNARD BLACK AND BRIAN CHEFFINS *
Delaware’s courts and well-developed case law are widely seen as integral
elements of Delaware’s success in attracting incorporations. However, as we show
using empirical evidence involving reported judicial decisions and filed cases
concerning large mergers and acquisitions, leveraged buyouts, and options
backdating, Delaware’s popularity as a venue for corporate litigation is under
threat. Today, a majority of shareholder suits involving Delaware companies are
being brought and decided elsewhere. We examine in this Article the implications
of this “out-of-Delaware” trend, emphasizing a difficult balancing act that
Delaware faces. If Delaware accommodates litigation too readily, companies,
fearful of lawsuits, may incorporate elsewhere. But if plaintiffs’ attorneys find the
Delaware courts unwelcoming, they can often file cases in other courts. Delaware
could risk losing its status as the de facto national corporate law court, as well as
the case flow that lets it provide the rich body of precedent that is part of
Delaware’s overall corporate law “brand.” We assess how the Delaware courts
and legislature, and Delaware companies, might respond to this threat to
Delaware’s pre-eminence as the leading forum for corporate cases, as well as
incorporations.
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1346
II. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE OUT-OF-DELAWARE TREND .................... 1351
A. THE JURISDICTIONAL TERRAIN ............................................................. 1351
B. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ........................................................................... 1353
C. ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE ......................................................................... 1363
III. WHAT HAS PROMPTED THE OUT-OF-DELAWARE TREND? ............................ 1364
A. WHO DECIDES WHERE LAWSUITS ARE BROUGHT? .............................. 1364

* Armour is Hogan Lovells Professor of Law and Finance, Faculty of Law, University
of Oxford, e-mail: john.armour@law.ox.ac.uk. Black is Nicholas J. Chabraja Professor at
Northwestern University, Law School and Kellogg School of Management, e-mail:
bblack@northwestern.edu. Cheffins is S.J. Berwin Professor of Corporate Law, Faculty of
Law, Cambridge University, e-mail: brc21@cam.ac.uk. We thank Nathan Chuang, Mitch
Fagen, Jonell Goco, Patrick Luff, Jose Miguel Mendoza, Ji Min Park, Alex Ruge, and Li
Weng for excellent research assistance, and Columbia Law School, the Searle Center on
Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth at Northwestern Law School, the University of
Oxford Law Faculty, and University of Texas Law School for financial support. We are
grateful for comments on this Article, and a companion empirical paper, by Keith Bishop,
Jill Fisch, Jeff Gordon, and Delaware Vice-Chancellor Travis Laster, and feedback at the
American Law and Economics Association (2011 annual meeting), Canadian Law and
Economics Association (2010 annual meeting), Conference on Empirical Legal Studies
(2010), Harvard Law School, Stanford Law School, University of Illinois Law School,
University of Leeds Law School, University of San Diego Law School, USD Law Center for
Corporate and Securities Law, Vanderbilt Law School Conference on Corporate Law (2010),
and Columbia Law School Conference on The Delaware Court of Chancery: Change and
Continuity (2011). We have also benefitted from discussions with various corporate lawyers,
including Randall Baron, Peter Carter, Travis Downs, Joel Friedlander, Stuart Grant, William
Lafferty, Mark Lebovitch, Roger Magnuson, Ted Mirvis, Stephen Radin, and Bryn Valler.

1346

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 87:1345

B. PREDICTABILITY, PRO-DEFENDANT BIAS, AND THE TIME DIMENSION .. 1365
C. JUDICIAL ATTITUDES CONCERNING THE PLAINTIFFS’ BAR ................... 1367
D. ATTORNEYS’ FEES ................................................................................ 1370
E. SELECTION OF LEAD COUNSEL .............................................................. 1372
IV. THE DELAWARE COURTS’ BALANCING ACT ................................................. 1380
A. JUDICIAL INCENTIVES TO REVERSE THE OUT-OF-DELAWARE TREND ... 1381
B. STEPS DELAWARE JUDGES COULD TAKE TO REVERSE THE OUT-OFDELAWARE TREND .................................................................................... 1384
C. WILL THE DELAWARE COURTS SEEK TO REGAIN MARKET SHARE? ..... 1387
V. OTHER POTENTIAL RESPONSES TO THE OUT-OF-DELAWARE TREND ............. 1392
A. SELF-HELP BY DELAWARE COMPANIES ................................................ 1392
B. DELAWARE LEGISLATION ..................................................................... 1394
C. FEDERAL REFORM ................................................................................. 1395
VI. THE PROS AND CONS OF THE OUT-OF-DELAWARE TREND ............................ 1396
A. THE MIXED IMPLICATIONS OF FORUM SHOPPING.................................. 1396
B. QUALITY OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING ............................................ 1397
C. IMPACT ON THE DELAWARE BRAND ...................................................... 1398
VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 1398
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................... 1400
I. INTRODUCTION
“I’m a litigator—and there’s only one rule in litigation: Three things matter—
location, location, location.” 1
A core feature of U.S. corporate law is regulatory competition. Companies can
choose which state’s corporate law will govern their affairs and states vie—to some
extent—to attract companies to incorporate. There has been intense scholarly
debate as to whether this competition for incorporations, which Delaware
dominates, is—for good or ill—a “race to the bottom” or a “race to the top.” 2 In
this Article we focus on a different aspect of corporate federalism that has received
little academic attention but has important implications: where are shareholder
lawsuits involving Delaware companies actually filed and resolved?
The answer has traditionally been, “Delaware, of course.” The Delaware courts,
termed “the Mother Court[s] of corporate law,” 3 have decided most major

1. Anywhere but Chancery: Ted Mirvis Sounds an Alarm and Suggests Some Solutions,
7 M&A J. 17, 18 (2007) (quoting Ted Mirvis of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and Katz).
2. The “race to the bottom” terminology was first coined by William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974).
Ralph Winter saw instead a “race to the top”: Ralph Winter, Private Goals and Competition
Among State Legal Systems, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 127, 128–29 (1982). For more recent
assessments, see, for example, Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the De1aware Courts in the
Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061 (2000); Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1749 (2006); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002).
3. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir. 1990), rev’d on
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corporate law cases in the United States, and courts in other states have often
applied Delaware precedents to non-Delaware corporations. An extensive body of
precedent, developed by expert judges, has been a key part of Delaware’s
“value-added” for firms, which has helped to sustain its high share in the market for
corporate law, despite premium pricing in the form of sizeable “franchise taxes”
levied on firms that incorporate there. 4 But, as we show in a companion paper,
Delaware’s share of shareholder suits against directors has dropped sharply over
the last 15 years. 5 Some plaintiffs’ law firms now prefer to file these suits
“anywhere but” Delaware. 6 Some companies are responding by adopting bylaws or
charter provisions specifying that claims arising under Delaware corporate law
should be brought in Delaware. 7 A 2011 California case held that such a “forum
selection” bylaw is unenforceable, 8 but more battles over forum selection clauses
can be expected.
In exploring the “market” for corporate lawsuits, we provide a novel twist on the
well-known debate over the competition for corporate charters. 9 The
out-of-Delaware trend implicates a different form of corporate law competition
scarcely noticed until recently, namely the venue where suits are filed. 10 This
other grounds, 500 U.S. 90 (1991), quoted in Jerue v. Millett, 66 P.3d 736, 745, n.26 (Alaska
2003); Stephen A. Radin, The New Stage of Corporate Governance Litigation: Section 220
Demands—Reprise, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1287, 1287–88 (2006).
4. On Delaware’s premium pricing, see Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price
Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1210–11
(2001).
5. John Armour, Bernard S. Black & Brian R. Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?
9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter ABC Losing Cases], available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578404.
6. As in the phrase used by Ted Mirvis. See Anywhere but Chancery (2007), supra
note 1, at 18 (emphasis added).
7. Joseph A. Grundfest, Choice of Forum Provisions in Intra-Corporate Litigation:
Mandatory and Elective Approaches (The 2010 Pileggi Lecture) (Rock Center for Corporate
Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 91, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1690561.
8. Galaviz v. Berg., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2011) (involving an
Oracle Corp. bylaw).
9. See generally Kagan Kocaoglu, A Comparative Bibliography: Regulatory
Competition on Corporate Law (Mar. 2008) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1103644.
10. For other recent papers addressing aspects of forum competition, see Jessica
Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1749 (2010) (finding that derivative lawsuits are commonly filed in federal court);
Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State Court, 80 U. CIN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1856695; Sara Lewis,
Transforming the “Anywhere but Chancery” Problem into the “Nowhere but Chancery”
Solution, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 199 (2008); Edward B. Micheletti & Jenness E. Parker,
Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation: Who Caused This Problem, and Can it be Fixed?, 37 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1 (2012); Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of
the Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 155–56 (2011); Faith Stevelman,
Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 57 (2009); Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, A Great Game: The
Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation (Apr. 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
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Article is the first to address systematically the issues the out-of-Delaware trend
poses for litigants, judges, and legislators.
To set the scene, we summarize our empirical data confirming the trend. We
then explore why the trend has arisen and consider its implications for Delaware’s
dominance as a locus for incorporations and as the principal source of corporate
case law. We also examine how the Delaware courts, its legislature, and companies
incorporated there might respond.
The out-of-Delaware trend highlights a difficult balancing act faced by
Delaware, especially its judiciary. If Delaware accommodates shareholder suits too
readily, plaintiffs’ attorneys will file an excess of cases, and companies, fearful of
litigation, may incorporate in a different state. On the other hand, if plaintiffs’
attorneys believe Delaware courts are unwelcoming, they may launch their actions
elsewhere. Some of these cases will present opportunities to develop new
precedents which will be missed by Delaware courts, thus compromising
Delaware’s responsiveness to new events. A pronounced out-of-Delaware trend
could also mean Delaware judges will forfeit some of their current national
recognition and esteem, and Delaware-based lawyers will lose status and income.
Recent efforts by the Delaware courts to discourage the filing of “weak” cases
illustrate the difficulty of this balancing act, as taking these steps may have
exacerbated the out-of-Delaware trend. Moreover, a strong effort to recapture
litigation “market share” could discredit the Delaware judiciary or prompt further
federalization of corporate law. 11
While views differ on the merits of state competition for incorporations of
publicly traded companies, there is little doubt that Delaware is the big winner.
More than 80% of public companies that incorporate outside their headquarters
state select Delaware, and about 60% of all U.S. public companies are incorporated
there. 12 Mark Roe has gone so far as to speculate that Delaware corporate law
could be “too big to fail,” 13 and Chancellor Leo Strine of Delaware’s Court of
Chancery has acknowledged that the state could be perceived as “a bit of a fat and
happy monopolist.” 14
Various explanations have been given for Delaware’s dominance. The state’s
small size and heavy reliance on revenues from franchise taxes reputedly combine
to yield a credible commitment to be responsive to corporate need. 15 There are
network externalities associated with choosing Delaware law, in the form of a
well-developed infrastructure of professionals supplying incorporation and legal

available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1984758.
11. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of
Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573 (2005); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117
HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003).
12. Bebchuk & Hamdani (2002), supra note 2, at 567 tbl.2, 578 tbl.5.
13. Mark J. Roe, Is Delaware’s Corporate Law Too Big to Fail?, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 75
(2008).
14. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware’s Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate America Buying
an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A Response to Kahan & Kamar’s Price
Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1265 (2001).
Strine was appointed Chancellor in 2011, after twelve years as a Vice-Chancellor.
15. Hamermesh (2006), supra note 2, at 1753–54; ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 38, 44 (1993).
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services. 16 Finally, and crucially for our purposes, the court system is a key aspect
of the Delaware “brand.” 17 For those who see Delaware as winning a “race to the
bottom,” Delaware judges ensure that the state offers “manager-friendly” decisions
to accompany its manager-friendly statute. 18 For those who take the view that
Delaware’s dominance of corporate law reflects a “race to the top” toward efficient
corporate law, Delaware-incorporated firms benefit from extensive precedents and
the decision-making expertise of the Delaware judges. 19
Delaware’s corporate law delegates regulatory power liberally to its judges,
often favoring flexible, judicially adopted standards. Consequently, much of what
matters in Delaware corporate law is a judicial construct, including the fiduciary
duties of directors, officers, and controlling shareholders, and the prerequisites for
bringing a derivative suit. 20 Thus, the depth and clarity of Delaware corporate law
could be compromised if case flow were to shrink. 21 Delaware judges are aware of
this. As Chancellor Strine stated in a 2007 case: “The important
coherence-generating benefits created by our judiciary’s handling of corporate
disputes are endangered if our state’s compelling public policy interest in deciding
these disputes is not recognized . . . .” 22 Chancellor Strine’s colleague, Vice
Chancellor Travis Laster, was sufficiently concerned about litigation migrating out
of his state to issue a general invitation to firms in a 2010 opinion to adopt charter
provisions making Delaware the exclusive forum for corporate suits. 23
One might think there would be little risk of the Delaware courts losing their
case flow. In 2010 the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform
ranked Delaware first among the 50 states for the quality and fairness of its
litigation environment for the eighth year in a row. 24 Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey

16. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81
VA. L. REV. 757, 846 (1995).
17. On the idea that Delaware’s legal regime is a “brand,” with the judiciary as a key
element, see Omari Scott Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware’s Dominance
and the Market for Corporate Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1129 (2008).
18. See, e.g., Cary (1974), supra note 2, at 670, 672 (“[J]udicial decisions can best be
reconciled on the basis of a desire to foster incorporation in Delaware. . . . Delaware
corporate decisions lean . . . to minimal standards of director responsibility . . . .”).
19. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84
NW. U. L. REV. 542, 589–91 (1990); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm
Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 540 (2001); William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the
Delaware Court of Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48
BUS. LAW. 351, 354 (1992).
20. Kahan & Rock (2005), supra note 11, 1591–92; Hamermesh (2006), supra note 2,
1777–78.
21. Stevelman (2009), supra note 10, at 122.
22. In re The Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 959 (Del. Ch. 2007).
23. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940 (Del. Ch. 2010).
24. U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, 2010 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE STATE
LIABILITY SYSTEMS RANKING STUDY 14 (2010), http://court.state.de.us/Superior/pdf/
harris_2010.pdf; see also Scott A. Holt, Delaware Courts Ranked 1st by U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, DEL. EMP. L. BLOG (Apr. 24, 2008), http://www.delawareemployment
lawblog.com/2008/04/delaware_courts_ranked_1st_by.html; Brett Melson, Delaware Is #1,
HARV. BUS. SERV. BLOG (June 3, 2009), http://blog.delawareinc.com/tag/us-chamber-of-
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Miller even argued in a widely cited 1987 article that, due to capture of the
litigation process by local lawyers, Delaware is unduly litigation friendly. 25
It cannot be taken for granted, however, that corporate litigation will be
launched in Delaware courts. Plaintiffs’ attorneys usually have a choice of venue
when filing a corporate suit. If they perceive that filing outside Delaware is
advantageous, they may well do so. They might avoid Delaware because they
believe its judges tend to favor corporate defendants. Delaware’s high rank from
the Chamber of Commerce may be exactly what plaintiffs do not want. Plaintiffs’
attorneys could also react to what the Delaware judiciary thinks of them and how it
polices the fees they are awarded when a case settles or the plaintiffs prevail at trial.
Over the last decade, Delaware judges have criticized plaintiffs’ attorneys who
have brought weak cases, sometimes sharply. Delaware judges have also
denounced lawyers racing to file first to gain strategic advantage 26 and have
sometimes cut back attorney fee requests when cases settle, including requests the
defendants have agreed not to oppose.
The cases Delaware loses because plaintiffs’ attorneys file lawsuits elsewhere
could well include “good” cases, which the state’s courts need to develop new
precedents. A recent wave of “option backdating” suits illustrates the point. Many
of these cases were widely viewed as meritorious, and a fair number generated
settlements of $10 million or more. Nevertheless, our research shows that the vast
majority of option backdating suits involving Delaware companies were filed
outside Delaware. The Delaware courts thus missed an opportunity to address the
responsibility of directors to oversee option granting practices.
The loss of potentially important cases appears to generalize beyond options
backdating. For example, in our empirical research, we also studied cases that give
rise to publicly distributed opinions—the ones that generate precedents. Delaware
is losing market share for these cases as well.
Delaware’s loss of litigation market share prompts a series of questions. What
has caused this trend? If Delaware companies want the Delaware courts to decide
their corporate law disputes, how can they make this more likely? If the Delaware
courts or legislature want Delaware to recapture litigation market share, how might
this be achieved? By how much will the migration of corporate suits away from
Delaware courts weaken the Delaware brand? And is the out-of-Delaware trend to
be welcomed?
We address these questions below, drawing on our empirical research and on a
series of interviews with plaintiffs’ and defense counsel. On the plaintiffs’ side, we
spoke to lawyers who approach Delaware from a variety of perspectives. Some
prefer to file in Delaware. Others avoid Delaware. Still others make a case-by-case
judgment call. With defense counsel, we sought to gauge awareness of the
out-of-Delaware trend, to learn what responses the trend has elicited, and to find
out what responses they expect from companies and the defense bar.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides an overview of the
jurisdictional terrain and summarizes our empirical evidence on the
commerce/.
25. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987).
26. See, e.g., King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc., 994 A.2d 354, 357 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(Chancellor Strine criticized the “lead counsel Olympics race.”).

2012]

DELAWARE’S BALANCING ACT

1351

out-of-Delaware trend. Part III explores why Delaware has been losing its cases.
Part IV focuses on the difficult balancing act that the out-of-Delaware trend calls
upon Delaware’s judges to perform. Part V discusses potential responses by firms
and legislators to the migration of cases away from Delaware. Part VI assesses the
normative implications of the out-of-Delaware trend. Part VII concludes.
II. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE OUT-OF-DELAWARE TREND
A. The Jurisdictional Terrain
It is conventional wisdom that most corporate law cases involving Delaware
public companies flow to Delaware. 27 William Cary, when he famously
characterized Delaware as the winner in a race to the bottom for incorporation
business, remarked on “the relative ease of entry into Delaware courts for suits
against corporate directors.” 28 Roberta Romano, a “race to the top” advocate,
reported that “most Delaware firms are in fact sued in Delaware.” 29 The
pre-eminent status of Delaware courts has strong historical roots. Norman Veasey,
a former chief justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, has observed that the flow of
corporate cases to Delaware extends back at least to the 1950s. 30
Delaware incorporation typically ensures that Delaware’s substantive law will
control in a suit under corporate law and that such a suit can be brought in
Delaware. 31 However, suits under corporate law can also be filed in any other court
with both subject matter jurisdiction over the claim and personal jurisdiction over
the defendants. In practice, the courts of a company’s headquarters state are almost
always an available forum for both direct suits (including class actions) and
derivative suits. Courts of general jurisdiction in that state will have subject matter
jurisdiction, and personal jurisdiction over the directors and officers will normally
be available as well. 32
The federal courts in a Delaware company’s headquarters state will also
normally have personal jurisdiction over the directors and officers, and thus may
offer a third potential forum. For subject matter jurisdiction, diversity jurisdiction is

27. Douglas M. Branson, Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group
Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L. REV. 85, 91 (1990) (describing “the never ending
flow of lawsuits to Delaware Chancery Court and appeals to the Delaware Supreme Court”);
Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1926 (1998); Macey & Miller (1987), supra note 25, at 496.
28. Cary (1974), supra note 2, at 686.
29. ROMANO (1993), supra note 15, at 41.
30. E. Norman Veasey, Musings from the Center of the Corporate Universe, 7 DEL. L.
REV. 163, 164, 167 (2004).
31. Jack B. Jacobs, The Reach of State Corporate Law Beyond State Borders:
Reflections upon Federalism, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1149, 1159–60 (2009); Larry E. Ribstein &
Erin Ann O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661, 662.
Directors and officers must consent to personal jurisdiction in Delaware as a condition of
incorporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114(a)–(b) (2011).
32. Most companies hold at least some board meetings at their headquarters; this
without more should provide the minimum contacts needed for personal jurisdiction.
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usually available for derivative suits. 33 For direct suits, plaintiffs can sometimes
combine a state law claim under corporate law with a related federal claim, often
under securities law, and rely on “supplemental” (or “pendent”) federal jurisdiction
over the corporate law claim. 34
Defendants in corporate litigation have some scope to challenge the litigation
venue choices plaintiffs make. If suits involving similar facts have been filed both
in Delaware and elsewhere, the defendants could seek a stay or dismissal of the
non-Delaware proceedings on forum non conveniens grounds. 35 Defendants in
practice may be reluctant to seek a stay because they “do not wish to alienate
potential fact-finders by openly fleeing one court for another.” 36 Moreover, success
in state court on a forum non conveniens motion is not assured, with the likelihood
of success decreasing if the case was filed first in that state court and there has been
significant progress in the litigation. 37
An alternative to a motion to dismiss a suit in one jurisdiction in favor of
another jurisdiction is for the defendants to use a “one forum” motion. The
defendants will apply to both forums for an order that the courts involved confer
and determine where the case should proceed. 38 An obvious risk is that, if the
orders are granted and the courts do confer, proceedings may not occur in the
defendant’s preferred forum.
For cases brought in federal courts under supplemental jurisdiction, a federal
judge may, in the interests of comity and judicial efficiency, dismiss or stay a
derivative lawsuit filed in federal court where a single state court action would
serve the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders. 39 However, success

33. Gilbert Newman, Manufacturing Diversity Jurisdiction, 14 VILL. L. REV. 727, 729
(1969).
34. Stanley A. Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation,
31 BUS. LAW. 883, 890 (1976); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (test for
“pendent” jurisdiction now included in “supplemental jurisdiction”); Finley v. United States
490 U.S. 545 (1989). For class actions in general, Congress has introduced various reforms
designed to expand federal court jurisdiction, primarily the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standard Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.), and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2006)). See Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class
Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593, 1597, 1601 (2008). But these statutes both contain
“Delaware carve-outs” and thus do not cover corporate law cases. See Kahan & Rock
(2005), supra note 11, 1587–88; Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Reputation of Delaware Courts
Wins Carve-Out in U.S. House Bill Regulating Class Actions, DEL. L. WKLY., Oct. 5, 1999,
at 7.
35. Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 344, 353, 389 (2006);
Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1679 (1990).
36. Brief of Special Counsel Gregory P. Williams, at 3, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology
Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 5890–VCL (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2011).
37. Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 522 (1996).
38. Micheletti & Parker (2012), supra note 10, at 18–19.
39. See, e.g., Weiss v. Doyle, 178 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). On the factors that
influence stay decisions, see Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Stay of Action in Federal Court
Until Determination of Similar Action Pending in State Court, 5 A.L.R. FED. 10, §§ 5[a],
6[a] (1970).
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on such a motion is not assured. Factors federal courts have cited when denying
applications for a stay in shareholder litigation include the federal courts having
diversity jurisdiction, the related state court case not having been significantly
litigated, the parties not facing undue hardship to travel to litigate in federal court,
and the federal complaint not being a “mirror image” of the state court complaint. 40
B. Empirical Evidence
Until recently, little empirical research had been done on venue choice in
corporate law, and none has been done with an explicit time trend. 41 Our data,
described in more detail in a companion paper, 42 confirm the conventional wisdom
on Delaware’s popularity at the start of our study period (the mid-1990s), and its
diminishing market share since then. We use four different datasets, and a
combination of different strategies for identifying lawsuits, to document the
out-of-Delaware trend, focusing in each instance on Delaware-incorporated public
companies.
1. Reported Decisions
Our first dataset involves cases where a written decision is publicly available,
either on a preliminary motion or after a trial. We collected all reported decisions
from Westlaw, Lexis, and the Delaware Chancery Court website from 1995 to 2009
arising from lawsuits where directors of public corporations were named as
defendants in claims brought under corporate law. 43 Given that a rich body of
precedents is an oft-cited Delaware strength, this dataset provides direct evidence
on the extent to which the out-of-Delaware trend puts this aspect of the Delaware
brand under threat. Also, a judge is more likely to issue an opinion in cases that are
vigorously contested and have implications for future litigants. 44 Thus, a written

40. Tabas v. Mullane, 608 F. Supp. 759, 763 (D.N.J. 1985) (application for stay
dismissed on the basis there was “no previously filed, significantly litigated, or more
advanced state action”); Loeb v. Whittaker Corp., 333 F. Supp. 484, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(“mirror image”); La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc., C.A.
No. 2:11-cv-4211(DMC)(MF), 2011 WL 4386774, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2011) (diversity
jurisdiction; lack of litigation activity in state court).
41. Several studies of aspects of corporate venue choice have recently appeared in
addition to our own. See Erickson (2010), supra note 10; Quinn (2011), supra note 10;
Johnson (2012), supra note 10; Cain & Davidoff (2012), supra note 10. These studies
generally confirm the out-of-Delaware trend we report but only cover the period after the
out-of-Delaware trend was well underway. We discuss each below.
42. ABC Losing Cases (2012), supra note 5.
43. We searched for suits (1) arising under corporate law, (2) in which one or more
directors was a defendant, and (3) that produced at least one publicly available judicial
decision between 1995 and 2009. For Westlaw, we searched the Allcases library; for Lexis,
we searched the Mega library. We also searched the Delaware Court of Chancery website,
which contains all written judicial opinions by Chancery Court judges from 2000 on. If a
case generated more than one decision, we assigned the case to the year of the first decision.
For details on our search criteria, see ABC Losing Cases (2012), supra note 5.
44. RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 19–20 (2d ed. 2009) (providing guidance
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decision is a proxy, albeit a crude one, for case importance. This dataset
accordingly provides evidence on the extent to which significant cases are
migrating away from Delaware.
Our dataset includes 704 cases over 15 years, of which 540 (77%) involved
Delaware companies. Figure 1 summarizes our results for these companies. The
number of cases with decisions in Delaware remained fairly constant over time. In
contrast, there was dramatic growth in the number of decisions outside Delaware,
especially in the federal courts.
Figure 1: Lawsuits Against Delaware Companies with Written Decisions, 1995–
2009
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Number of cases involving suits under corporate law against directors of Delaware public companies
and location of decision, for cases with one or more reported decisions on Westlaw, Lexis, or the
Delaware Chancery Court website, with the first reported decision issued between 1995 and 2009.

Figure 2 converts this flow of cases into proportions. The fraction of decisions
issued by Delaware judges fell steadily, from 80% in 1995 to an average of 31%
over 2005–2009. The percentage decided in other state courts increased somewhat,
but the principal growth was in the fraction of decisions in federal courts.

on when judges should write opinions).
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Figure 2: Proportion of Corporate Law Decisions Involving Delaware
Companies by Location, 1995–2009
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Proportion of cases involving suits under corporate law against directors of Delaware public
companies by location, for cases with one or more reported decisions on Westlaw, Lexis, or the
Delaware Chancery Court website, with the first reported decision issued between 1995 and 2009.

Our judicial opinions dataset provides prima facie evidence that Delaware
courts have suffered a major drop in market share in producing corporate law
jurisprudence. Still, focusing on publicly-available judicial opinions provides only
a partial view of underlying trends. Cases that lead to written decisions may not be
representative of all cases that are filed. 45 Cases with decisions must be serious
enough for a judge to take the time to write an opinion, and Lexis or Westlaw must
then deem the opinion to be sufficiently important to merit dissemination. Also, in
many states, most trial court decisions are not published. 46 For appellate rulings,
many states either have a presumption against publication or reserve publication for
cases that establish a new rule, modify or criticize an existing legal rule, or involve
an issue of continuing public interest. 47

45. For criticisms of research that relies solely on reported decisions, see, for example,
Erickson (2010), supra note 10, at 1753–54; David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey
R. Lidicker, Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 688–89
(2007); Pauline T. Kim, Margo Schlanger, Christina L. Boyd & Andrew D. Martin, How
Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 96–97
(2009).
46. Peter W. Martin, Reconfiguring Law Reports and the Concept of Precedent for a
Digital Age, 53 VILL. L. REV. 1, 17–18, 31, 34–35 (2008) (noting that this tradition emerged
when cases were reported in print and selectivity was required because published law reports
were costly to produce, distribute, and store).
47. Jane Williams, Survey of State Court Opinion Writing and Publication Practices, 83
LAW LIBR. J. 21, 22 (1991).
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2. Large Mergers and Acquisitions
To respond to the limitations of research based on reported cases, we
investigated cases filed. There is no data source that would let us find all corporate
suits filed, in federal court and all 50 states. We therefore focused on three key
categories of cases where it was feasible to identify suits filed: large mergers and
acquisitions, leveraged buyouts, and instances where corporate executives allegedly
benefitted from options backdating.
Mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) transactions account for a large fraction of
corporate lawsuits involving public companies. 48 Accordingly, we studied filings
relating to the 25 largest completed M&A transactions for each year from 1994 to
2009, measured by transaction value, where the acquired company was based in the
United States and publicly traded, to find out whether shareholder lawsuits had
been filed and, if so, where. 49 Of the 400 target companies, 395 had filings
available on the SEC’s EDGAR database, and 256 of these were incorporated in
Delaware. We searched these companies’ filings and found takeover-related
shareholder suits under corporate law against the target and/or its board for 121 of
these 256 firms (47%).
Figure 3 summarizes when and where the suits involving the 121 Delaware
targets were filed. 50 The average number of suits was about 18 per year, with a
surge beginning around 2004, consistent with press reports that M&A litigation
was increasing. 51 Through 2001, most suits were filed in Delaware. From that point
onwards, the non-Delaware share has grown substantially.

48. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 169 tbl.2 (2004)
(during 1999 and 2000 a total of 952 fiduciary suits were brought in Delaware courts where
a public company was involved, and 796—nearly 80%—of these lawsuits involved
acquisitions).
49. We used the SDC Platinum database, accessed through Thomson One Banker. We
excluded leveraged buyouts, which we investigate separately. The data reported in this
Article for large M&A and LBO transactions extend through 2009; the results in ABC Losing
Cases (2012), supra note 5, extend through 2010 but are otherwise consistent.
50. We treated multiple suits in any given jurisdiction as one suit, whether or not these
suits were formally consolidated. In the federal courts, Delaware courts, and most other state
courts, multiple suits in the same jurisdiction involving similar facts typically will be
consolidated and the court will appoint a lead plaintiff(s) and law firm(s), at least if the case
proceeds beyond an early stage.
51. Ken MacFadyen, A Low Plaintiffs Bar?, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: THE
DEALMAKERS J., Oct. 2010, at 22; Dionne Searcey & Ashby Jones, First, the Merger; Then
the Lawsuit, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (Jan. 10, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748704482704576072050216781160.html?mod=rss.

2012]

DELAWARE’S BALANCING ACT

1357

Figure 3: Corporate Lawsuits Involving 25 Largest M&A Transactions by
Location, 1994–2009
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Suits under corporate law against Delaware public companies that were acquired in the largest 25
M&A transactions in each year, by location of suit, 1994–2009. One or more suits in a single
jurisdiction are treated as a single suit.

Figure 4 turns the large-deal M&A case counts into percentages and further
confirms the out-of-Delaware trend. Between 1994 and 2001, 69% of the suits were
filed in Delaware. From 2002 onward, this average dropped to 31%.
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Figure 4: Proportion of Corporate Lawsuits Involving 25 Largest M&A
Transactions by Location, 1994–2009
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Proportions of suits under corporate law against Delaware public companies that were acquired in the
largest 25 M&A transactions in each year, by location of suit, 1994–2009. One or more suits in a single
jurisdiction are treated as a single suit.

A related trend is that, while it used to be common for suits in cases arising from
large M&A transactions to be filed only in Delaware, this has become rare. As
Figure 5 indicates, through 2001, Delaware was always a forum in corporate
lawsuits arising from the 25 largest M&A transactions and often was the sole
forum. From 2002 onwards, Delaware was rarely the sole forum. Indeed, from
2006 to 2009, Delaware was the sole venue exactly once, and, in almost half of
litigated major takeovers, Delaware was not a forum at all.
Figure 5: Proportion of 25 Largest M&A Transactions with Lawsuits Filed in
Delaware Only, Delaware and Elsewhere, and Only Outside Delaware, 1994–
2009
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For the largest 25 M&A transactions in each year with a Delaware-incorporated target and at least one
suit filed under corporate law, locations of suits (Delaware only, Delaware plus another forum, or
outside Delaware only), 1994–2009. One or more suits in a single jurisdiction are treated as a single
suit.
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Several recent studies confirm that out-of-Delaware suits challenging takeovers
are common with Delaware companies. Brian Quinn examined the litigation venue
for 119 mergers occurring between August 2009 and August 2010 with a public
Delaware target and a transaction value of at least $100 million. 52 Of the 97 deals
with deal-related litigation, Delaware was the sole forum only 8 times. For 41 of
the 97 litigated deals, all suits were filed outside Delaware. Jennifer Johnson found
196 instances in 2010 where class actions were filed under state corporate law
involving Delaware public companies, of which 193 involved M&A transactions. 53
These 196 class actions gave rise to 265 suits, of which 103 (39%) were brought in
Delaware, 115 in other state courts, and 47 in federal court. Thus, for 93 of the
Delaware firms (47%), the plaintiffs sued only outside Delaware. Matthew Cain
and Steven Davidoff studied 955 takeovers with a transaction value of over $100
million completed between 2005 and 2010, and found shareholder suits in 475
deals (50%). They do not report how many suits involve Delaware companies, but
their data indirectly shows the extent of the out-of-Delaware trend. Of 322 cases
which settled, only 90 (28%) were settled in Delaware courts even though 595 of
the 955 targets (62%) were Delaware companies. 54
3. Leveraged Buyout Transactions
To provide a different window into M&A litigation trends, we studied leveraged
buyouts (“LBOs”) of public companies. Many significant recent Delaware cases
involve these going-private transactions, which are litigation prone, and for good
reason. Insiders will often be, or expect to be, on the side intending to take the
company private, in which case they will prefer a lower price. 55 Shareholder
plaintiffs (and their lawyers) understandably will wonder if, or how strongly, the
board will seek to maximize the takeover price. 56
As with large M&A transactions, we obtained data for LBOs from the SDC
Platinum database, relying on their “leveraged buyouts” category. We found 511
LBOs of public companies announced and completed between 1995 and 2009. Of
these, 477 had filings on EDGAR and 300 of those 477 (63%) were incorporated in
Delaware. We found corporate litigation for 141 (47%) of the 300 Delaware
targets, all from 1997 onwards. 57 Figure 6 indicates when and where these suits
were filed.

52. Quinn (2011), supra note 10, at 9.
53. Johnson (2012), supra note 10, at 37. Johnson refers to these suits as “state
securities class actions.” Id. However, the suits she studies arise under corporate law, not
“securities law.” Id.
54. Cain & Davidoff (2012), supra note 10, at 31–32 tbl.1, 35 tbl.3.
55. As Chancellor Strine observed in In re The Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d
951, 963 (Del. Ch. 2007), “Few contexts are more important to stockholders than the
pendency of a transaction in which they exchange their shares for cash and the company is
taken private.”
56. Randall Chase, Delaware Judges Want Say in Private Equity Liability Cases,
INSURANCE J. (May 22, 2007), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2007/05/
22/79917.htm.
57. Part of the reason there were no LBOs in our dataset for 1995 and 1996 was that
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Figure 6 shows that the number of LBO-related suits rises and falls with market
cycles in private equity buyouts, which were common during the late 1990s and
boomed in the mid-2000s. 58 With respect to where the lawsuits were filed, the
pattern Figure 6 reveals is, by now, familiar. Most suits challenging LBOs by
Delaware companies were filed in Delaware through 2002, and other venues grew
in popularity thereafter. From 1997 to 2001, 73% of LBO suits involving Delaware
companies were in Delaware. For 2002 to 2009, the equivalent figure was only
45%.
Figure 6: Corporate Lawsuits Involving Leveraged Buyouts in Delaware, Other
States, and Federal Courts, 1997–2009
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Suits under corporate law against Delaware public companies acquired in leveraged buyouts in each
year, by location of suit, 1997–2009. One or more suits in a single jurisdiction are treated as a single
suit.

Figure 7 translates the LBO case count into percentages. It reveals that as cases
were increasingly brought outside Delaware, other state courts were typically the
venue chosen.

public company LBOs were not common during those years. See Brian Cheffins & John
Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 20 fig.1 (2008). Also, LBO
targets are smaller than the targets in our “large” M&A dataset, so targets in 1995 and 1996
may have been too small to appear on EDGAR, a system that was then being phased in.
Office of Interactive Disclosure: History, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Jan. 8, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/xbrl/oid-history.shtml. The median transaction value in our
LBO dataset was $1.55 billion, versus $13.33 billion for our mega-deal dataset.
58. For general trends with LBO activity, see Cheffins & Armour (2008), supra note 57,
at 20 fig.1, 22–24.
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Figure 7: Proportion of Suits Involving Leveraged Buyouts in Delaware, Other
States, and Federal Courts, 1997–2009
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Proportions of corporate lawsuits against Delaware public companies acquired in leveraged buyouts in
each year by location of suit, 1997–2009. One or more suits in a single jurisdiction are treated as a
single suit.

With LBOs, as with large M&A transactions, it was common in the early part of
our study period for lawsuits to be filed only in Delaware, but this subsequently
became rare. As Figure 8 indicates, while between 1997 and 2002 Delaware was
the only forum in which LBO suits were filed in 66% of transactions with lawsuits,
this figure dropped to 26% between 2003 and 2009. Between 2007 and 2009 only
two LBOs involved “Delaware only” litigation. Likewise, while lawsuits were filed
solely outside Delaware in only 18% of LBOs from 1997 to 2002, this figure grew
to 41% between 2003 and 2009. Hence, our LBO data confirms a robust outof-Delaware trend.
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Figure 8: Proportion of Leveraged Buyouts with Lawsuits Filed in Delaware
Only, Delaware and Elsewhere, and Only Outside Delaware, 1997–2009
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For leveraged buyouts in each year, with a Delaware-incorporated target and at least one suit under
corporate law, locations of suits (Delaware only, Delaware plus another forum, or outside Delaware
only), 1997–2009. One or more suits in a single jurisdiction are treated as a single suit.

4. Options Backdating Cases
Corporate suits involving takeovers are usually direct suits, generally filed as
class actions, rather than derivative suits. 59 To round out our analysis of where
corporate suits are filed, we turn next to options backdating cases, which were
typically brought as derivative suits. 60 These suits arose out of allegations that
largely came to light in 2005 and 2006. The standard pattern was that companies
granted stock options with an exercise price based on a trading price from an earlier
date which was below the market price at the date of grant and then claimed they
had issued the options with an “at market” exercise price. 61 Options backdating was
a major public scandal, which led to many restatements of financial results, many
civil lawsuits and settlements, a number of SEC investigations, and a few criminal
convictions. 62 The civil lawsuits rested on apparent self-dealing and, as both our

59. Thompson & Thomas (2004), supra note 48, at 168.
60. The other possibility, for companies which restated their financial results, was a
securities class action suit, but plaintiffs’ lawyers pursued this option less often because
many options backdating announcements did not produce a sharp drop in the share price,
typically a key element in a successful securities law class action. See Paul Sweeney, Legal
Niceties Color Backdating Cases, FIN. EXECUTIVE, July–Aug. 2007, at 33.
61. Christy L. Abbott, The Shareholder Derivative Suit as a Response to Stock Option
Backdating, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 593, 597–99 (2009).
62. Timothy P. Stone, The Rise and Fall of Options Backdating: From Executive
Windfall to Executive Pitfall, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 174 (2009). On the SEC investigations, see
Stephen J. Choi, A.C. Pritchard & Anat Carmy Wiechman, Scandal Enforcement at the SEC:
Salience and the Arc of the Option Backdating Investigations (Sept. 1, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1876727.
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plaintiff and defense lawyer interviewees advised us, many were seen as offering
good prospects for monetary recoveries. 63
We relied on a variety of sources to identify 165 companies whose directors
faced options backdating derivative lawsuits and investigated these suits. 64 Of these
companies, 127 (77%) were incorporated in Delaware. For these 127 firms, we
found 234 derivative lawsuits, of which only 26 (11%) were filed in Delaware.
Delaware was the sole forum for suits involving only four companies. About half
of these 234 cases (115) were filed in federal court (normally relying on diversity
jurisdiction), and the other 93 cases were filed in state court in a state other than
Delaware. An important wave of corporate litigation thus largely bypassed the
Delaware courts. A study by Jessica Erickson of derivative suits filed in federal
court over a one year period during 2005–2006 indicates that derivative suits
involving allegations other than options backdating are also often filed in federal
court. The filing rate she found was substantially higher than prior studies had
found for derivative suits filed in Delaware. 65
C. Anecdotal Evidence
Our quantitative evidence shows clearly that while plaintiffs’ lawyers
traditionally preferred to launch suits involving Delaware companies in Delaware
court, they now often sue in federal court or another state court for derivative suits
and in another state court for direct (typically class action) suits. Delaware now
rarely exercises full control over corporate litigation, in the sense of being the sole
forum. In many cases, it never sees the litigation at all.
Anecdotal evidence supports our empirical findings. Our interviews with
plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers confirmed awareness of a growing tendency on the
part of plaintiffs’ lawyers to file outside Delaware. Moreover, over the past few
years, commentators have remarked upon an erosion of Delaware’s litigation
dominance. 66 For instance, in 2007, Ted Mirvis, a litigation partner in the wellknown Wachtell Lipton law firm, referred to an “Anywhere But Chancery” trend,
with “Chancery” being the Delaware Chancery Court. 67 Likewise, a New York
City Bar Association Committee noted in a 2008 report that it had become
“common” for shareholder suits in M&A transactions to be filed in multiple
jurisdictions. 68 Further evidence comes from a recent uptick in companies adopting

63. Amanda Bronstad, Backdating Cases Head to Settlement, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 18, 2008,
at 1.
64. For details, see ABC Losing Cases (2012), supra note 5, at 23–27.
65. Erickson (2010), supra note 10, at 1757, 1761–62. Though Erickson did not focus
exclusively on publicly traded companies, most of the suits she studied involved such
companies. Id. at 1770.
66. See, e.g., David Marcus, Did Chancery Fee Rulings Chase Away Plaintiffs
Lawyers?, DEL. L. WKLY., Nov. 29, 2006, at 1; Ken MacFadyen, Delaware Ruling Alters
M&A Landscape, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIG., Apr. 16, 2007, at 3; Elizabeth Bennett,
Delaware Keeps Its Pre-Eminence in Business Litigation, DEL. L. WKLY., May 2, 2007, at 1
(citing views of Chief Justice Myron Steele of the Delaware Supreme Court).
67. Anywhere but Chancery (2007), supra note 1.
68. COMMITTEE ON SECURITIES LITIGATION, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
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bylaws or charter provisions making Delaware the preferred forum for corporate
suits, a trend we discuss in Part V.
III. WHAT HAS PROMPTED THE OUT-OF-DELAWARE TREND?
The out-of-Delaware trend raises questions concerning causes, potential cures,
and its consequences for Delaware’s pre-eminence. 69 The remainder of the Article
addresses these topics. In this Part, we assess the potential causes of the trend.
A. Who Decides Where Lawsuits Are Brought?
From among the available fora, plaintiffs choose where to sue. As a practical
matter, the forum choice for representative litigation under corporate law (either a
derivative suit or a class action suit) 70 will usually be made by the law firms acting
on behalf of plaintiffs, with little or no client input. 71 Lawyers can only sue where
they are permitted to practice, but Delaware readily accommodates out-of-state
counsel, so this is not a major constraint on the choice of venue. 72
To be sure, if suits are filed in more than one forum, the defendants can move to
stay in one forum, in favor of their preferred forum. These motions are made with
some frequency, but far from all of the time. When made, they do not always
succeed. 73 Moreover, defense counsel may sometimes prefer sidetracking Delaware

NEW YORK, COORDINATING RELATED SECURITIES LITIGATION: A POSITION PAPER 3 (2008).
The Committee focused on the multiplication of suits, rather than their location. Id. at 1–2.
69. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
70. On derivative actions and shareholder class actions qualifying as representative
litigation, see Amy M. Koopmann, A Necessary Gatekeeper: The Fiduciary Duties of the
Lead Plaintiff in Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 34 J. CORP. L. 895, 899 (2009).
71. On plaintiffs lawyers’ control over this choice, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (1991); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications for Economic Theory
for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
669, 679–84 (1986); Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and
Derivative Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 423, 433 (1993).
72. See DEL. STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE TO DENNIS L. SCHRADER, ESQUIRE, PRESIDENT, DELAWARE STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION 2, 10 (2001), available at http://www.dsba.org/pdfs/MJPReport.pdf (indicating
the system in place was working well and that numerous out-of-state lawyers were routinely
given permission to litigate in Delaware courts).
73. We studied stay applications and their outcomes for our options backdating dataset.
Of the 97 companies which faced backdating derivative suits in two or more jurisdictions, 31
(32%) reported that there had been a motion granted to stay in favor of another jurisdiction
or a motion to remove a case from state court to federal court. Of these 31 companies, 24
were Delaware companies. Three other companies (two of which were Delaware firms) had
stay motions which were denied; one further Delaware company had a motion which was
reported as pending. Since we relied on company 10-Ks as the principal source of
information about stay motions, we might have missed some motions, especially
unsuccessful ones, which companies might not have reported.
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proceedings in favor of a competing forum. 74 Indeed, if federal diversity
jurisdiction is available, a defendant may remove the case to federal court as of
right. 75 Thus, stay motions reduce, but far from eliminate, the impact of
out-of-Delaware choices by plaintiffs’ lawyers. We therefore explore in this section
the principal reasons why plaintiffs’ lawyers are making different choices today
than 15 years ago.
B. Predictability, Pro-Defendant Bias, and the Time Dimension
Ted Mirvis, the Wachtell Lipton litigation partner, has suggested that corporate
lawsuits have “greater settlement value outside of Delaware” due to greater
variation in possible outcomes. 76 He points out that outcomes in Delaware are
reasonably predictable due to the rich body of precedents and the judiciary’s
familiarity with the conduct expected of the principal corporate actors. Plaintiffs’
attorneys therefore have little scope to seek a generous settlement by relying on the
possibility of a disastrous trial outcome. Plaintiffs’ lawyers, according to Mirvis,
have greater leverage outside Delaware due to the risk that a non-Delaware judge
or jury will grant inappropriately generous relief.
These conjectures are plausible, but cannot, without more, explain the time trend
we document. Greater certainty would have been a feature of Delaware litigation
15 years ago, as much as today. 77 Thus, even if litigation (un)certainty partly
explains why plaintiffs’ lawyers may prefer a non-Delaware forum, this factor
cannot readily explain why they sue outside Delaware far more often today than in
the 1990s.
A similar difficulty arises with a second plausible explanation for plaintiffs
filing outside Delaware—Delaware judges favor corporate defendants. 78 Some
plaintiffs’ lawyers we interviewed told us that the likelihood of appearing before a
sympathetic judge is one factor in deciding where to file. Empirical research on
choice of forum confirms that attorney perceptions of judicial predispositions
strongly influence where cases are filed. 79 As a result, a perceived pro-manager

74. For examples, see In re Bear Stearns Cos. Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 3643–VCP,
2008 WL 959992 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2008), available at 33 Del. J. Corp. L. 515 (2008)
(defendants moving to stay Delaware action in favor of New York actions); Transcript of
Courtroom Status Conference, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings Inc., No. 5890–
VCL, (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2010) (hearing on proposed dismissal of Delaware suit in
anticipation of a court-approved settlement in Arizona courts).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006).
76. Anywhere but Chancery (2007), supra note 1, at 17; see also Micheletti & Parker
(2012), supra note 10, at 6–7.
77. Certainty has been cited as a virtue of Delaware law for over two decades. See, e.g.,
Macey & Miller (1987), supra note 25, at 484; ROMANO (1993), supra note 15, at 39–40;
Demetrios G. Kaouris, Is Delaware Still a Haven for Incorporation?, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L.
965, 977 (1995).
78. Mark Lebovitch, Jerry Silk & Jeremy Friedman, Improving Multi-Jurisdictional,
Merger-Related Litigation, ABA COMMERCIAL & BUS. LITIG. COMM., Feb. 14, 2011, at 1,
available at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/commercial/articles.html
(reporting that many plaintiffs’ lawyers “perceive Delaware as less shareholder-friendly”).
79. Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class
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bias could cause plaintiffs’ lawyers to avoid the Delaware courts. 80 But the claim
that the Delaware courts favor management is an old one. For example, William
Cary complained in 1974 that the Delaware courts had “watered the rights of
shareholders vis-à-vis management down to a thin gruel.” 81 Yet Delaware’s
dominance of corporate litigation has eroded only recently.
Pro-manager bias could account for the out-of-Delaware trend our data reveals if
this bias is greater now than formerly. Is this the case? Norman Veasey, former
chief justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, does not think so. He observed in a
2005 survey of Delaware case law that “Delaware courts today are not any more
‘pro-stockholder’ and less ‘pro-director’ or ‘pro-manager’ than they were in the
past, or vice versa.” 82
Our own sense is that the Delaware courts are not significantly more
pro-manager today than in the 1990s. There have been, to be sure, some moves in
Delaware toward greater deference to management. The Delaware courts have
watered down the board’s Revlon duty in the takeover context to seek the highest
price reasonably available by allowing a broad range of board processes to satisfy
this duty. 83 They have also announced a tough “conscious disregard” of duty
standard for finding that outside directors acted in bad faith and hence are not
protected by a section 102(b)(7) charter provision exempting directors from
monetary liability 84—and they have never found this standard to be met. 85 Still, in
broader terms, the Delaware courts were attentive to self-dealing in the 1990s and

Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 611 (2006).
80. Stevelman (2009), supra note 10, at 97.
81. Cary (1974), supra note 2, at 666; see also William M. Lafferty & W. Leighton Lord
III, Towards a Relaxed Summary Judgment Standard for the Delaware Court of Chancery: A
New Weapon Against “Strike” Suits, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 921, 928 (1990); Renee M. Jones,
Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625, 645–
54 (2004).
82. E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware
Corporate Law and Governance from 1992–2004? A Retrospective on Some Key
Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1496 (2005).
83. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
For an example of the discretion given to target boards, see In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder
Litig., 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005). One of our defense counsel interviewees cited Toys
“R” Us as a spur for plaintiffs’ preference to file outside Delaware.
84. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d. 27, 62–67 (Del. 2006).
85. The most recent Chancery Court decision that let such a claim survive a motion for
summary judgment was reversed by the Delaware Supreme Court. See Ryan v. Lyondell
Chem. Co., C.A. No. 3176–VCN, 2008 WL 2923427 (Del. Ch. July 29, 2008), rev’d, 970
A.2d 235 (Del. 2009).
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remain so. 86 Moreover, absent self-dealing, they rarely disturbed board decisions
then, and rarely do so today. 87
Some of the plaintiffs’ lawyers we interviewed, however, believe that the
Delaware courts have become more defendant friendly in various ways. They told
us that some Delaware judges presume that any case brought is weak, until proven
otherwise. Several stressed the need to build credibility with the Delaware judges
by bringing good cases, and only good cases. 88 Others reported difficulty getting
judicial approval for expedited discovery, even in cases with apparently strong
facts. Another complaint was that it was hard to get a preliminary injunction
hearing in merger cases until shortly before the shareholder vote, when there was
almost no chance the judge would delay the vote.
Our judgment, developed next, is that the Delaware courts’ increasingly
skeptical view of the plaintiffs’ bar did more to foster the out-of-Delaware trend
than any increase in pro-defendant bias. Still, perceived pro-defendant bias could
have contributed indirectly to the out-of-Delaware trend. Once plaintiff firms had
other reasons to file elsewhere, and became comfortable with doing so, a sense that
Delaware judges favor management, perhaps more than judges elsewhere, could
provide an additional reason for filing outside Delaware.
C. Judicial Attitudes Concerning the Plaintiffs’ Bar
Various recent utterances and rulings by Delaware judges suggest a jaundiced
view of at least some members of the plaintiffs’ bar. These misgivings could lead
some law firms to hesitate before filing in Delaware courts. Judicial skepticism
toward the plaintiffs’ bar could be related to a general pro-management orientation,
but could also exist separately. Judges might believe that suits that target true
managerial misfeasance are, as Chancellor Chandler said in In re Fuqua Industries,
Inc. Shareholder Litigation, “a cornerstone of sound corporate governance” 89 and
yet still believe that attorneys who bring weak cases do judges, executives,
directors, and stockholders a disservice. Various opinions, especially by Chancellor
Strine and Vice Chancellor Laster, conform to this point of view.

86. On scrutiny of self-dealing, see Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does
Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1015 (1997) (“Directors of
Delaware corporations can do anything they want, as long as it is not illegal, and as long as
they act in good faith.” (emphasis added)). For a recent example, see In re S. Peru Copper
Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 30 A.3d 60 (Del. Ch. 2011) (awarding $1.26 billion in
damages from related party transaction), opinion revised and superseded, C.A. No. 961–CS,
2011 WL 6440761 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2011).
87. For recent confirmation of the Delaware courts’ reluctance to overrule board
decisions absent self-dealing, see Air Prod. & Chem., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del.
Ch. 2011) (upholding continued use of “poison pill” defense by Airgas board after losing
proxy context brought by hostile bidder).
88. One plaintiffs’ lawyer told us that his firm would drop a case brought in Delaware if
the supporting facts turned out to be weak, rather than pursue the modest settlement that
those facts might support. Another advised that he would bring strong cases in Delaware, but
weaker ones, where he hoped to “free ride” on parallel securities litigation, elsewhere.
89. 752 A.2d 126, 133 (Del. Ch. 1999).
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In re Cox Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, a 2005 case, illustrates
the doubts expressed about the plaintiffs’ bar. 90 Chancellor Strine, while ruling that
plaintiffs’ attorneys who settled a class action lawsuit over a going-private
transaction should receive only one quarter of the $5 million in fees they had
requested and to which the defendants had not objected, expressed misgivings
about both shareholder class actions and the plaintiffs’ bar. He criticized in
particular the tendency for a takeover announcement to prompt “hastily-filed,
first-day complaints that serve no purpose other than for a particular law firm and
its client to get into the medal round of the filing speed (also formerly known as the
lead counsel selection) Olympics.” 91 He continued:
Particularly in the representative litigation context, where there are
deep concerns about the agency costs imposed by plaintiffs’ attorneys,
our judiciary must be vigilant to make sure that the incentives we create
promote integrity and that we do not, by judicial doctrine, generate the
need for defendants to settle simply because they have no viable
alternative, even when they have done nothing wrong. 92
Chancellor Strine acknowledged that shareholder suits are an important check
against director wrongdoing. 93 Nevertheless, his skeptical words could have given
some plaintiffs’ lawyers reason to file elsewhere. 94 The effect would have been
magnified by his fee cut. Various plaintiffs’ lawyers we interviewed cited Cox
Communications as an important reason to avoid Delaware.
Various decisions by Vice Chancellor Laster also betray doubts about many
shareholder suits and some plaintiffs’ law firms. In In re Revlon, Inc. Shareholders
Litigation, he took control of a case involving a going-private transaction away
from lead counsel, finding that the lawyers had failed to provide adequate
representation. 95 In so doing Vice Chancellor Laster wrote that the current litigation
system “generates questionable benefits for class [action suit] members, provides
transaction-wide releases for defendants, and offers a good living for the traditional
plaintiffs’ bar.” 96 In In re Compellent Technologies, multiple class actions were
filed alleging breaches of duty by Compellent’s directors in selling the company
and a motion was brought to consolidate the various proceedings. Vice Chancellor
Laster observed, when seeking further information from the contending law firms,
that “the whole problem is the diversion of interests between entrepreneurial
plaintiffs’ counsel and the class. You all maximize by getting the most fee for the
least work.” 97

90. 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005); see also, e.g., In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990
A.2d 940 (Del. Ch. 2010).
91. In re Cox Commc’ns Inc., S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d at 608; see also id. at 614–23,
642–48.
92. Id. at 643.
93. Id.
94. See David Marcus, State of Denial, DAILY DEAL, Nov. 20, 2006 (available through
LexisNexis Academic using search terms “State of Denial”).
95. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d at 961.
96. Id. at 959–60.
97. Transcript of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction & the Court’s Ruling at
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In Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, where Vice Chancellor Laster was
asked to approve a settlement that would shut down litigation in Delaware in favor
of a parallel Arizona case, he cast aspersions on takeover-related suits, saying “a lot
of these sue-on-every-deal cases are . . . worthless, they’re simply we see the
announcement, then we file, okay?” 98 He ordered an investigation by special
counsel of possible collusion between plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers, and
suggested that he might bar David Berger, a senior partner at Silicon Valley-based
Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, from practicing in Delaware courts. The
investigation generated considerable concern among both the defense and
plaintiffs’ bar, 99 but the special counsel recommended against any sanction. 100
Despite his sharp criticism of the plaintiffs’ bar, Vice Chancellor Laster insists
he is not pro-defendant. 101 His apparent view is that good cases should be
vigorously pursued and bad cases should not be brought, at least not in Delaware.
He will praise plaintiffs’ lawyers too, saying in a 2010 hearing where he declined to
enjoin a bid by Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd. to acquire Zenith National
Insurance Corp. that “[t]his was a well-litigated, well-presented case. It’s one the
plaintiffs were justified in bringing.” 102 Likewise, in Landry’s Restaurants, Vice
Chancellor Laster approved a $12 million fee award, calling the settlement
“excellent” and the fee “reasonable and . . . well earned.” 103
The more “pro-Delaware” plaintiffs’ lawyers we interviewed were generally
proud of the quality of the cases they bring and maintained they were not too
discomfited by what Chancellor Strine and Vice Chancellor Laster have said. Yet
harsh words, directed at much of the plaintiffs’ bar, are likely to discourage filing
in Delaware. Several of the plaintiffs’ lawyers we interviewed cited this sort of
rhetoric to support their Delaware-skeptical views. As a 2011 news report said of
Vice Chancellor Laster, “Lawyers . . . understandably might want to avoid the
newest judge on one of the top U.S. business courts.” 104
Judicial skepticism toward the plaintiffs’ bar is a relatively recent phenomenon
in Delaware, and its timing is consistent with erosion of the state’s litigation market
share. Delaware has traditionally been seen as litigation friendly, with the Delaware
corporate bar allegedly supporting an “easy to sue” system that ensured business
for Delaware lawyers in an otherwise “pro-manager” state. 105 Joseph Bishop said of
Delaware more than forty years ago, “Delaware’s general approach to stockholder
*7, In re Compellent Tech., Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6084–VCL (Del. Ch. Jan. 13,
2011).
98. Courtroom Status Conference at 16, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, C.A.
No. 5890–VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2010).
99. Amy Kolz, Rigging the Game?, AM. LAW., Mar. 1, 2011, at 13.
100. Brief of Special Counsel Gregory P. Williams at 41, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology
Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 5890–VCL (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2011).
101. Judge Rattles Lawyers in U.S. Shareholder Battles, HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS,
Feb. 11, 2011.
102. David Marcus, Mixed Message, THE DEAL MAGAZINE (June 4, 2010),
http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/034577/insights/safe-harbor/mixed-message.php.
103. Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 21, 25, Louisiana Mun. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v.
Fertitta, C.A. No. 4339–VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2010).
104. Judge Rattles Lawyers in U.S. Shareholder Battles (2011), supra note 101.
105. Cary (1974), supra note 2, at 686–88; Macey & Miller (1987), supra note 25, at
510–13.
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litigation . . . is to make it easy to sue the executives of Delaware corporations, no
matter where they reside or the corporation does business, so long as the suit is in
Delaware courts, and conducted by Delaware counsel.” 106 Douglas Branson said
similarly about twenty years ago, “Delaware makes suit in Delaware the obvious
choice.” 107 The rhetoric in cases like Cox Communications, Revlon, and Scully is a
marked departure from this litigation-friendly posture and plausibly contributed to
the out-of-Delaware trend.
D. Attorneys’ Fees
Cases such as Cox Communications and Revlon are troubling for plaintiffs’
lawyers quite apart from their rhetoric. In Cox Communications, Chancellor Strine
cut the fee requested by plaintiffs’ lawyers by 75%. In Revlon, Vice Chancellor
Laster took a case away from lead counsel entirely, presumably dashing their fee
hopes as well. Unsurprisingly, fees are an important factor in lawyers’ choice of
where to file suit. 108 Our interviewees told us that Delaware courts scrutinize fee
requests closely, but elsewhere judges routinely approve fee awards, at least if the
defendant does not object. A 2011 ruling by Vice Chancellor Laster in a case where
shareholder lawsuits had been launched in both Florida and Delaware confirms the
point, as he acknowledged that plaintiffs’ lawyers, aware that Delaware courts
would likely only award attorneys’ fees of “$400,000 or $500,000” for the case,
could reason “let's go to Florida and get $1 million.” 109
While Delaware courts now scrutinize fee petitions closely, this is a relatively
recent development. In most states, courts used a “lodestar” approach where fee
awards were based on hours devoted to a case. Delaware courts, in contrast, used
the relief obtained as the primary benchmark. 110 Delaware’s approach was widely
believed to be more generous. 111 As a 1989 law review article said, “the
multimillion dollar fees awarded in many shareholder actions brought in Delaware
give some credence to an old Italian proverb that describes a lawsuit as a fruit tree
in the garden of the lawyer.” 112
Empirical studies of settlements in class actions and derivative suits indicated
that the Delaware Court of Chancery approved virtually all settlements parties had
reached and endorsed the awarding of the full amount of attorneys’ fees agreed

106. Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1084 (1968).
107. Branson (1990), supra note 27, at 91.
108. COMMITTEE ON SECURITIES LITIGATION (2010), supra note 68, at 5; Todd J. Zywicki,
Is Forum Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1174
(2006); see also Coffee (1986), supra note 71, at 686 (noting that in representative litigation,
the attorney’s recovery, rather than expected plaintiffs’ damages, create the incentive to sue).
109. Status Conference at *9, In re Burger King Holdings, Inc., S’holders Litig., C.A.
No. 5808–VCL (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2011).
110. Macey & Miller (1987), supra note 25, at 497.
111. Branson (1990), supra note 27, at 101–02.
112. Donald E. Pease, Delaware’s Disclosure Rule: The “Complete Candor” Standard,
Its Application, and Why Sue in Delaware, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 445, 496–97 (1989).
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upon in pretty much all instances. 113 Delaware courts accordingly gained a
reputation for being plaintiff friendly in shareholder litigation. 114 This, moreover,
was perceived by Delaware judges to be part of the Delaware brand. Then Vice
Chancellor Carolyn Berger co-authored an empirical study of attorneys’ fees
awards from 1990 to 1992 and said of the study, “we have come up with some
internal statistics that just might demonstrate convincingly why plaintiffs’ lawyers
often head in our direction.” 115 Her summary: “Plaintiffs stand an extremely good
chance of having their settlements approved here, and their lawyers are likely to be
awarded handsome fees.” 116
Chancellor Chandler, in a 1999 case, defended Delaware’s approach, saying the
judiciary wanted to ensure plaintiffs’ lawyers were “economically incentivized to
perform [a] service on behalf of shareholders.” 117 A change of heart was imminent,
however. Chancellor Chandler, in a 2001 working paper that updated Vice
Chancellor Berger’s study and confirmed that Delaware judges typically approved
attorney fee proposals, indicated his unease, saying that “in the absence of an
adversarial process at the fee award stage, judges in a common law system do not
have the tools necessary to make consistently reasonable and fair judgments about
such questions.” 118
Chancellor Chandler’s misgivings found expression in a 2001 decision. The
Grant & Eisenhofer law firm sought approval for a $24.75 million fee in an M&A
case where the firm secured a $180 million settlement for minority shareholders in
Digex. 119 Chancellor Chandler instead awarded $12.3 million, saying: “There is no
reason for the court to believe that a 7.5 percent fee will provide a disincentive to
plaintiffs’ attorneys or their clients.” 120 Grant & Eisenhofer, unsurprisingly, had a
different view. 121

113. Carolyn Berger & Darla Pomeroy, Settlement Fever: How a Delaware Court Tackles
Its Cases, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept.–Oct. 1992, at 7 (studying 98 corporate and class action suits
arising between 1990 and 1992, where “more than 95 percent of all the proposed settlements
were approved . . . and approximately two-thirds of the attorneys’ fee [applications] were
granted in full”); William B. Chandler III, Awarding Counsel Fees in Class and Derivative
Litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancery (Apr. 20, 2001) (unpublished working paper)
(on file with the authors) (for settlements between 1998 and 2001, two-thirds of fee petitions
were granted in full and the remaining one-third were reduced, on average, by 20%); Elliott
J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes
Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1847, 1872 (2004) (reporting that all 47
settlements arising from 1999–2001 merger cases were approved, with fees awarded in full
in 40 cases).
114. Fisch (2000), supra note 2, at 1092.
115. Berger & Pomeroy (1992), supra note 113, at 7.
116. Id.
117. In re Fuqua Indus., Inc. S’holder Litig., 752 A.2d 126, 133 (Del. Ch. 1999).
118. Chandler (2001), supra note 113, at 5.
119. David Marcus, Half a Loaf Is Still Plenty of Bread, DEL. L. WKLY., May 29, 2001, at
4; see also Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of
Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1777–78 (2004) (reporting the Digex
settlement amount as $165 million).
120. Marcus (2001), supra note 119.
121. Id.
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Other fee-cut cases followed. One was Cox Communications. 122 Another was a
2005 ruling by Vice Chancellor Lamb in a takeover case, where he reduced a
$1,623,000 proposed award to $450,000. 123 These cases prompted speculation that
fee reductions by Delaware judges could encourage lawyers to file elsewhere. 124
Delaware courts nevertheless remain prepared to subject attorneys’ fees to
“rigorous scrutiny.” 125 For instance, in 2010 Vice Chancellor Parsons rejected in
Cox Radio a $3.6 million fee request and awarded only $1,077,038, 126 and Vice
Chancellor Laster, in Brinckerhoff v. Texas Eastern Products Pipeline Company,
awarded a fee of $10 million rather than the $19.5 million requested despite
“significant litigation efforts” because much litigation remained, including expert
discovery and trial preparation. 127
Might the fee cut in the Digex litigation have marked an important turning
point? Our data suggests that it might, in that the out-of-Delaware trend for
leveraged buyout cases lines up decently with the timing of the Digex ruling (see
Figure 8). The substantive law relating to leveraged buyouts likely did not play a
role, as Delaware judges have long been thought of as being tough on the selfdealing that can occur in these transactions. 128 Might Cox Communications have
marked a further turning point for the out-of-Delaware trend? Some of our
interviewees thought so, 129 but the evidence is mixed. Much of our data suggest a
trend that began earlier, around 2000 or 2001, which coincides with Digex.
E. Selection of Lead Counsel
The approach the Delaware courts adopt when selecting lead counsel could be
an additional cause of the out-of-Delaware trend. A change in approach by
Delaware judges, starting in 2000, likely encouraged some plaintiffs’ firms to file
suits outside Delaware.
Often, multiple lawsuits based on the same facts are filed in the same
jurisdiction. 130 The courts in that jurisdiction normally consolidate these suits into a
single suit and appoint lead counsel, who will do most of the work and receive
most of any eventual fee award. 131 Thus, lead counsel is a coveted position.

122. In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005).
123. In re Instinet Grp., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 1289–N., 2005 WL 3501708, at
*1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 14, 2005).
124. Marcus (2006), supra note 94.
125. In re Cox Radio, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 4461–VCP, 2010 WL 1806616, at
*20 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2010).
126. Id. at *23.
127. Brinckerhoff v. Texas E. Prods. Pipeline Co., 986 A.2d 370, 396 (Del. Ch. 2010).
128. See, e.g., Rock (1997), supra note 86.
129. See also Micheletti & Parker (2012), supra note 10, at 8–9 (“[S]ome track the
origin of the multi-jurisdictional boom to . . . Cox”).
130. For our large M&A transaction dataset, in cases where at least one lawsuit was filed
Delaware targets received an average of 6.3 lawsuits per deal before consolidation of
multiple filings in the same jurisdiction. The equivalent figure for LBOs was 3.2.
131. Thompson & Thomas (2004), supra note 48, at 156 n.94; Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on
the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 650, 654 (2002).
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If courts resolve disputes concerning lead counsel status by focusing on which
law firm was first to file, a “filing Olympics” is a logical by-product. A bias in
favor of the first law firm to file used to apply in Delaware corporate litigation, and
often continues to apply elsewhere. However, beginning in 2000, the Delaware
courts moved to an approach closer to that used in federal securities cases, giving
preference to firms whose clients had a substantial economic stake in the
outcome. 132 More recently, Delaware courts have also focused on the reputation
and past results of law firms seeking the lead counsel role. 133 Law firms with a
limited track record or lacking a client with a large shareholding thus have had
reason to file elsewhere.
Traditionally, the Delaware courts took a hands-off approach in determining
who should be lead counsel, and expected plaintiffs’ lawyers to sort this out for
themselves. 134 The plaintiffs’ bar responded with a simple organizing principle: the
firm who filed first should be lead or co-lead counsel. The natural result was “a
race to the courthouse.” 135 Thompson and Thomas report that of 623 deal-related
corporate law class actions filed in Delaware in 1999 and 2000, almost 70% were
filed within three days of the announcement of the transaction. 136
The Delaware Supreme Court acknowledged in 1993 that the “‘first to file’
custom” had generated “a plethora of superficial complaints.” 137 Only in 2000,
however, did the Delaware courts directly question the presumption that prompt
filing would be rewarded if disputes arose among plaintiffs’ lawyers over the lead
counsel role. In TCW Technology Ltd. Partnership v. Intermedia Communications,
Inc., 138 which arose from the same Digex transaction that prompted Chancellor
Chandler’s ruling on attorneys’ fees, he said, “Although it might be thought, based
on myths, fables, or mere urban legends, that the first to file a lawsuit in this Court
wins some advantage in the race to represent the shareholder class, that assumption,
in my opinion, has neither empirical nor logical support.” 139 The first-to-file
“custom” had remained undisturbed because the Delaware courts had left it to
plaintiffs’ lawyers to sort the matter out for themselves. To quote Chancellor
Chandler again:

132. We discuss the changes in Delaware’s approach to appointing lead counsel below.
See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
133. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
134. Weiss & White (2004), supra note 113, at 1846; TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship v.
Intermedia Commc’ns, Inc., No. 18336, 18289, 18293, 2000 WL 1654504, at *3 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 17, 2000); In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. C.A. 18700–NC, 2001 WL 618210,
at *1 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2001).
135. Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of
Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53 (2001).
136. Thompson & Thomas (2004), supra note 48, at 182–83; see also Weiss & White
(2004), supra note 113, at 1827 (of 104 mergers of Delaware-incorporated public companies
occurring between 1999 and 2001, with 77 the initial filing occurred within one day of the
merger announcement).
137. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 935 n.10 (Del. 1993).
138. TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship, 2000 WL 1654504.
139. Id. at *3.
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Over the past ten years, members of the Court of Chancery have been
asked, with increasing frequency, to become involved in the sometimes
unseemly internecine struggles within the plaintiffs’ bar over the power
to control, direct and (one suspects) ultimately settle shareholder
lawsuits filed in this jurisdiction. In every single instance that I am able
to recall, this Court has resisted being drawn into such disputes. In
every instance, the plaintiffs’ bar has been able to work out a
consolidation compromise. It may have been imperfect, but the
compromise has always seemed, in the end, to accommodate
reasonably the interests of all the parties and the Court. 140
With plaintiff self-regulation having failed in the Digex litigation, Chancellor
Chandler named as lead counsel Grant & Eisenhofer, the firm acting on behalf of
an institutional shareholder, the Kansas Public Employees Retirement System. He
identified three factors a Delaware court would consider should the issue arise
again: the quality of the pleadings, the energy and enthusiasm demonstrated by the
various attorneys, and the size of the economic stake each plaintiff had in the
litigation. 141 This third factor, as Chancellor Chandler noted, was similar to the
approach adopted in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA) 142 for securities class actions. 143 Chancellor Chandler did not formally
adopt the federal model, but he did say it was appropriate “to give recognition to
large shareholders or significant institutional investors who are willing to litigate
vigorously on behalf of an entire class of shareholders.” 144 Recent Delaware Court
of Chancery decisions involving a leadership fight suggest that attorneys’
credentials will also be important. 145

140. Id.
141. Id. at *4; see also In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. C.A. 18700–NC, 2001
WL 618210, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2001) (identifying the same factors and noting possible
additional relevant factors).
142. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
143. See TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship, 2000 WL 1654504, at * 4.
144. Id. Delaware courts subsequently indicated that the size of a plaintiff’s holding was
not to be “used to generate a formalistic ranking, . . . but rather” was relevant in determining
whether the plaintiff had “an economic incentive to monitor counsel.” In re Revlon, Inc.
S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 955 (Del. Ch. 2010); see also Wiehl v. Eon Labs, No. Civ.A.
1116–N, 2005 WL 696764, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 2005).
145. See Transcript of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction & the Court’s
Ruling at *6, In re Compellent Tech., Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6084–VCL (Del. Ch.
Jan. 13, 2011) (Vice Chancellor Laster said that “the key factor for me . . . is what your
[firm’s] track record in generating tangible benefits for stockholders.”); In re Del Monte
Foods Co. S’holder Litig., No. 6027–VCL, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 255, at *17–18, 27–34
(Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2010) (Vice Chancellor Laster granted lead counsel status to a law firm’s
attorneys representing a pension fund owning far fewer shares than another contender, based
on the capabilities of the law firms involved); Transcript of Oral Argument on Plaintiffs’
Motions to Consolidate and to Appoint Lead Plaintiff and Co-Lead Counsel at 33, In re
Novell Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 6032–VCN, 2011 WL 4091502 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2010)
(Vice Chancellor Noble appointed lead counsel based on his determination of which law
firm would be most likely to produce a favorable outcome for shareholders).
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The Delaware courts did not entirely abandon the first-to-file custom after TCW
Technology. In In re IBP, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, a 2001 case where
Chancellor Strine declined to stay a Delaware suit in favor of the Arkansas court
system, he said:
The fact that the court treats these actions as contemporaneously filed
does not mean that the first time-stamp should lose all relevance. In
close cases where the issue of convenience is in equipoise, it makes
sense as a matter of comity to regard the first time-stamp factor as a
tipping one in a forum non conveniens analysis. 146
Subsequent cases would soon establish, however, that any first-to-file edge was
weak at best in Delaware courts.
In the 2003 case of Biondi v. Scrushy, Vice Chancellor Strine declined to stay a
Delaware derivative lawsuit in deference to litigation launched earlier in Alabama.
In so doing, he remarked on the “public policy interest favoring the submission of
thoughtful, well-researched complaints – rather than ones regurgitating the
morning’s financial press” and observed that “Delaware law places more emphasis
on quality than speed when assessing derivative complaints.” 147 Similarly, in Rosen
v. Wind River Systems, a 2009 case where Vice Chancellor Parsons declined to
dismiss a Delaware suit in deference to suits filed earlier in California, he declined
to “reward the most fleet-of-foot in a sprint to the courthouse.” 148
A 2010 case, King v. VeriFone Holdings, confirms that being first to file is of
limited value in Delaware. The case involved an application to examine corporate
books and records under Delaware corporate law by an applicant who was already
lead plaintiff in a derivative suit in federal court arising from the same facts. Vice
Chancellor Strine rejected the application, saying he preferred not to reward
“plaintiffs and their counsel who sue first, and investigate and think second.” 149
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed this ruling but noted that “[b]eing the ‘first
to file’ does not automatically confer lead-plaintiff status.” 150
Although disfavored in Delaware, the first-to-file “custom” has retained
vibrancy elsewhere. When plaintiffs’ lawyers cannot resolve for themselves who
should be lead counsel, judges outside Delaware often appoint as lead or co-lead
counsel the firm that filed first. 151 King v. VeriFone Holdings illustrates the vitality
of the first-to-file custom outside Delaware. Counsel for the lead plaintiff in the

146. In re IBP, Inc., S’holders Litig. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. CIV.A.18373, 2001 WL
406292, at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 2001).
147. Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148, 1162 (Del. Ch. 2003).
148. Rosen v. Wind River Sys., Inc., C.A. No. 4674–VCP, 2009 WL 1856460, at *5
(Del. Ch. June 26, 2009).
149. King v. VeriFone Holdings Inc., 994 A.2d 354, 364 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2010) rev’d, 12
A.3d 1140 (Del. 2011).
150. King v. VeriFone Holdings Inc., 12 A.3d 1140, 1151 (Del. 2011).
151. ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 9.35 (4th ed.
2002); Lebovitch, Silk & Friedman (2011), supra note 78, at 3; Quinn (2011), supra note 10,
at 22. No statute or procedural rule directly gives the courts authority to appoint lead
counsel, but MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1958), is commonly cited as
supporting this power. Fisch (2001), supra note 135, at 56 n.17.
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federal derivative suit admitted in the Delaware hearing that he had filed rapidly in
federal court to gain an edge in what Vice Chancellor Strine labeled the “lead
counsel Olympics race.” 152 As Strine said, “Counsel’s sense of the incentive system
at work was vindicated.” 153
The more favorable treatment of nimble filers outside Delaware creates
incentives for some plaintiffs’ lawyers to file outside Delaware. Imagine a modestsized plaintiffs’ firm located in a public company’s home state, representing a small
stockholder and lacking a strong Delaware track record. The firm is unlikely to
garner lead counsel status in Delaware, but it has a chance if it is first to file
elsewhere. Moreover, if a more thoughtful complaint is later filed in Delaware, the
first-to-file firm can piggyback on the work by Delaware counsel in his own action.
To the extent that TCW Technology and related cases encouraged nimble,
modest-sized law firms to file cases outside Delaware, the resulting out-ofDelaware trend would have emerged during the first half of the 2000s, consistent
with the empirical evidence summarized in Part II. 154 One should not assume,
however, that fast filing has ceased in Delaware. As Vice Chancellor Laster
observed in 2010, “[T]he first cases often appear minutes or hours after the
announcement with others following within a matter of days.” 155 Presumably, the
fast filers believe that filing first continues to be advantageous, perhaps in private
negotiations over the lead counsel role with other firms.
The first-to-file presumption is not absolute outside Delaware. According to
Newberg on Class Actions: “The first attorney to file is not entitled to special
consideration for appointment as lead counsel . . . . ” 156 Moreover, the federal
courts, in assigning lead counsel in a corporate case, will likely be influenced by
the securities law presumption in favor of the law firm with the largest client. 157
Still, a likely partial cause of the out-of-Delaware trend is the fact that filing first
can help in a lead counsel contest and, since TCW Technology, likely helps more
outside Delaware.
F. Changes to Federal Securities Law and “Tagalong” Derivative Suits
In the 1980s, federal securities class actions burgeoned, particularly against
high-tech companies. 158 A backlash ensued, 159 which led to the adoption of the

152. King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc., 994 A.2d 354, 357 (Del. Ch. 2010), rev’d, 12 A.3d
1140 (Del. 2011).
153. King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc., 994 A.2d at 358.
154. Caution is required in inferring causation. The decision in TCW Technology did not
elicit much press attention. The only article discussing the case we found was a brief one that
did not discuss the out-of-Delaware incentives the decision created: Del. Judge Uses Reform
Act Model, Chooses Institutional Investor for Lead Role, ANDREWS DEL. CORP. LITIG. REP.,
Nov. 13, 2000, at 3.
155. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 943 (Del. Ch. 2010); see also In
re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holder Litig., 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005).
156. CONTE & NEWBERG (2002), supra note 151, § 9.35.
157. See discussion of case law in King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc., 12 A.3d 1140, 1151
n.66 (Del. 2011).
158. Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L.
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PSLRA in 1995 and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) in
1998. 160 Prior to the PSLRA, one did not normally see securities class actions and
derivative suits both filed based on the same underlying facts. 161 However, the
limits that the PSLRA imposed on discovery changed this, and generated a surge in
“parallel” or “tagalong” derivative suits launched in state court in parallel with
federal securities claims and arising from similar facts. 162 For reasons we discuss
below, many of these derivative suits are filed outside Delaware.
The PSLRA responded, in part, to a belief that plaintiffs’ lawyers often filed
securities class actions with weak facts and then used discovery to conduct a
“fishing expedition” for facts that would support their claims, while counting on the
high cost of discovery, borne largely by defendants, to create leverage to settle even
weak cases. 163 The PSLRA therefore required securities lawsuits to be supported by
a detailed factual pleading and barred discovery until a case survived a motion to
dismiss. 164 To survive that motion, a complaint had to allege with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendants had acted with scienter. 165
Many plaintiffs’ lawyers initially sidestepped the PSLRA by bringing securities
suits in state court. 166 Congress reacted by enacting SLUSA in 1998, which let
defendants remove a securities class action lawsuit filed in state court to federal
court. 167 State securities class actions quickly disappeared. 168
ECON. & ORG. 55, 58–60 (1991); Securities Fraud Litigation: Both Sides Agree It Is a
Never-Ending Battle, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 1992, at 1 (remarks of William Lerach,
indicating that the number of securities class action rose steadily from 1982 to 1991);
Nanette L. Stasko, Competitive Bidding in the Courthouse: In re Oracle Securities
Litigation, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1667, 1670–71 (1994).
159. William S. Lerach, Securities Class Actions and Derivative Litigation Involving
Public Companies: One Plaintiff’s Perspective, in 399 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE,
LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 65, 99–107 (1990).
160. The PSLRA is Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in various parts of 15
U.S.C.). The SLUSA is Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)
and 15 U.S.C. § 78bb).
161. See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of Shareholder
Litigation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 75, 78 (2008); David Priebe, Piling On: The
Reemergence of the Parallel Derivative Lawsuit as the Federal Securities Class Action
Window Closes, in 1136 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 333, 335 (1999); Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas,
The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1773 (2004)
(indicating that where plaintiffs could bring a federal securities class action or a derivative
lawsuit under Delaware corporate law, they would usually opt for the former).
162. See Erickson (2010), supra note 10, at 1778; Erickson (2008), supra note 161, at
85–86; Priebe (1999), supra note 161, at 337, 339.
163. Erickson (2008), supra note 161, at 93.
164. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(b), 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006).
165. See id. (discovery); id. § 78u-4(b)(2) (pleading standard).
166. Peter Q. Bassett & Kelly C. Wilcove, Post Reform Act Developments in Derivative,
Financial Advisor, and State Court Securities Litigation, in 1199 PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 545, 550–51 (2000);
Jordan A. Costa, Note, Removal of Securities Act of 1933 Claims After SLUSA: What
Congress Changed, and What It Left Alone, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1193, 1202–03 (2004).
167. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(c), 78bb(f)(2).
168. Priebe (1999), supra note 161, at 335; Costa (2004), supra note 166, at 1205.
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Plaintiffs’ lawyers then changed tactics again. Many began to file “parallel” or
“tagalong” derivative suits under state corporate law based on the same basic facts
as a securities case. 169 There is considerable potential for derivative suits to
complement or substitute for securities suits because director or officer misconduct
that results in misleading or incomplete disclosure can provide the foundation for
both types of claims. 170 Plaintiffs’ lawyers who had launched securities class
actions found it useful to file parallel derivative suits because they could use
discovery in the corporate case to provide the detailed factual support needed for
the federal securities claim. 171 The derivative case might also contribute to
settlement value. Another possibility was for a firm that did not have a lead role in
a securities class action to launch a parallel derivative suit, perhaps seeking to get a
piece of an expected overall global settlement of both cases. 172
SLUSA did not allow defendants to remove derivative suits filed in state courts
to federal court because it contained a “Delaware carve-out” that exempted actions
under state corporate law. 173 Moreover, state courts generally rejected defense
petitions to stay discovery in a derivative suit until after the federal motion to
dismiss in the accompanying securities litigation was decided. 174 The overall result
was what one press report termed an “explosion” in tagalong derivative lawsuits. 175
One study reports that the fraction of settled securities class actions accompanied
by a parallel derivative suit ranged from only 11% to 26% annually between 1997

169. See Erickson (2010), supra note 10, at 1776; Priebe (1999), supra note 161, at 335.
170. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998); Erickson (2008), supra note 159, at
88–90 (2008). Often, the alleged misconduct is by executives, who do not benefit from a
section 102(b)(7) charter provision barring monetary recovery from directors for good faith
conduct. These provisions do not protect officer-directors when they act in their officer
capacity. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgement Rule, 60
BUS. LAW. 439, 461 (2005). Plaintiffs often allege that the directors knowingly participated
or acquiesced in dishonest conduct so as to justify not making demand on the board to bring
a derivative suit. See Priebe (1999), supra note 161, at 337, 339.
171. Michael A. Collora & David M. Osborne, Class-Action Reforms Spur Derivative
Claims, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 15, 1999, at B8; Erickson (2008), supra note 161, at 94; Lower
Court Ruling Will Encourage ‘Tag Along’ Derivative Suits, Say Directors, ANDREWS SEC.
LITIG. & REG. REP., Apr. 14, 1999, at 5.
http://www.orrick.com/practices/
172. See
Derivative
Suits,
ORRICK.COM,
securities_litigation/derivative_suits.asp.
173. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(d)(1), 77p(f)(2)(B), 78bb(f)(3), 78bb(f)(5)(C) (2006); Bassett &
Wilcove (2000), supra note 166, at 557–58.
174. For a summary of relevant decisions, see Marvin L. Frank, Staying Derivative
Actions Pursuant to PSLRA and SLUSA, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 21, 2005, at 4. There have been
some cases, however, where courts have stayed “piggyback” derivative actions. See, e.g.,
Breault v. Folino, No. SACV010826GLTANX, 2002 WL 31974381 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15,
2002); Brudno v. Wise, No. Civ.A. 19953, 2003 WL 1874750 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 2003).
175. Mark Friedman, Dillard’s Inc. Shareholders Try New Tack, ARK. BUS., July 6, 2009,
at 1; see also Frank (2005), supra note 174.
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and 2002 but then grew to 65% in 2007 and has remained above 50% annually
thereafter. 176
Due to features of Delaware law, the PSLRA-induced surge in derivative
litigation likely contributed to the out-of-Delaware corporate litigation trend. Many
states permit discovery in derivative actions prior to a motion to dismiss; Delaware
is among the minority that do not. 177 Many states also routinely allow expedited
discovery; in contrast, the Delaware courts are selective in granting expedited
discovery requests, and often deny them unless there is a colorable claim of
irreparable harm, which does not exist in most tagalong cases. 178 Our interviewees
also advised us that when the Delaware courts do grant expedited discovery, it
sometimes comes too late to be useful in seeking an injunction. This is a particular
concern in takeover cases. Plaintiffs’ attorneys who bring tagalong derivative suits
usually want early discovery, so they have a strong incentive to proceed outside
Delaware. The post-SLUSA emergence of tagalong derivative suits coincided in
time with the out-of-Delaware trend, and plausibly contributed to the trend.
Delaware corporate law offers a potential substitute for expedited discovery—
inspection of books and records under section 220 of the Delaware General
Corporation Law. Plaintiffs can seek to use information gained through this
inspection to support their claims in a derivative suit or a securities action. 179
However, a section 220 application is costly and risky, as considerable effort is
typically needed to succeed. Moreover, expedited court handling of a section 220
application, or of discovery if the application is granted, is not assured. In addition,
even if a section 220 application is granted and the plaintiffs secure additional
evidence from the inspection of books and records and then launch a derivative
suit, the Delaware courts may order a stay of the derivative suit if it overlaps too
closely with a related securities lawsuit. 180 Thus, while some plaintiffs’ lawyers
have brought section 220 applications instead of tagalong derivative suits, many
have found it easier to file outside Delaware and pursue conventional expedited
discovery.
G. Summary
Delaware is well known as a manager-friendly state. One source for the out-ofDelaware trend would be if Delaware had become even more so beginning around
2000, thus driving plaintiffs’ lawyers to file cases elsewhere. We cannot rule out
this explanation as part of the overall story. Still, on the whole, the Delaware courts
do not appear to be significantly more pro-manager today than in the 1990s. The
dominant explanations for the out-of-Delaware trend lie elsewhere.

176. JORDAN MILEV, ROBERT PATTON, SVETLANA STARYKH & JOHN MONTGOMERY,
RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2011 YEAR-END REVIEW 16
(2011), available at http://www.nera.com/67_7557.htm.
177. See Frank (2005), supra note 174.
178. Id. (discussing eight leading cases where the issue arose).
179. Radin (2006), supra note 3, at 1290, 1296; see also Romero v. Career Educ. Corp.,
No. Civ.A. 793–N, 2005 WL 5750613 (Del. Ch. July 19, 2005).
180. Brenner v. Albrecht, C.A. No. 6514–VCP, 2012 WL 252286 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27,
2012).
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We have identified four factors that likely contributed to the out-of-Delaware
trend: (i) statements by Delaware judges expressing doubts, sometimes strong ones,
about the plaintiffs’ bar and the suits that they bring; (ii) Delaware judges cutting
plaintiffs’ lawyers’ fee requests; (iii) Delaware courts retreating from the “first to
file” custom in choosing lead counsel; and (iv) plaintiffs’ lawyers beginning to file
tagalong derivative suits, usually outside Delaware because expedited discovery is
often easier to obtain elsewhere. Each of these factors directly affects plaintiffs’
lawyers, who decide where corporate law cases will be brought. There is no
conclusive case for causation. Nevertheless, as we turn to the policy implications of
the out-of-Delaware trend and potential responses by Delaware and Delawareincorporated companies, our departure point is that factors that the Delaware courts
and legislators can influence helped to prompt the migration of cases out of
Delaware. A change of course thus might bring many cases back.
Our analysis of causes of the out-of-Delaware trend is not exhaustive. Changes
to the plaintiffs’ bar are also potentially relevant. For instance, Chancellor Strine’s
explanation for what Ted Mirvis termed the “Anywhere But Chancery”
phenomenon was that there had been “a fragmentation in the plaintiffs’ bar . . . that
has caused there to be more of a melee.” 181 The enactment of the PSLRA, with its
emphasis on detailed factual pleadings and its presumption that the lead counsel
role should be assigned to the law firm with the largest client based on shares held,
drove many smaller, less well-capitalized firms out of the securities fraud area, and
some of these firms shifted to corporate litigation. 182 In addition, during the
mid-2000s various large plaintiff firms who had focused primarily on securities
litigation began to put greater emphasis on corporate suits, with potentially
lucrative options backdating cases being particularly alluring. 183 Greater
competition among plaintiffs’ lawyers in the corporate law area could have
contributed to the out-of-Delaware trend because, for some firms, filing outside
Delaware could provide an escape from a filing logjam in Delaware. We do not
pursue this factor further here because from a policy perspective Delaware is not in
a position to reverse the plaintiffs’ bar’s recent fragmentation, but do so in related
research. 184
IV. THE DELAWARE COURTS’ BALANCING ACT
Losing litigation market share to other courts puts Delaware judges on the spot.
The trend, if sustained, could erode their status as the de facto “national” corporate
judiciary, as well as the value of Delaware’s body of precedents. Thus, Delaware

181. Quoted in Anywhere but Chancery (2007), supra note 1, at 18.
182. See Stevelman (2009), supra note 10, at 99; Renee Deger, State of Alert: Silicone
Valley Corporate Firms on Guard as the Plaintiffs Bar Takes Securities Cases to State
Court, RECORDER (S.F.), Aug. 9, 2001, at 3.
183. Justin Scheck, Class Rules Not So Bad After All, RECORDER (S.F.), July 3, 2006;
Susanne Sclafane, Plaintiffs Choosy About Derivative Suit Filings, Lawyer Tells D&O
Underwriters, NAT’L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY, Mar. 1, 2010.
184. John Armour, Bernard S. Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware Corporate Litigation
and the Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs’ Bar, 2012 COL. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2030398.
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judges have incentives to address the out-of-Delaware trend, but to succeed they
will need to execute a delicate balancing act. We discuss in this section these
incentives, together with the opportunities Delaware judges have to reverse the
trend and the constraints they face if they try.
A. Judicial Incentives to Reverse the Out-of-Delaware Trend
Delaware’s Court of Chancery judges are often characterized as an elite judicial
corps that engages in principled lawmaking, thus enhancing Delaware’s legitimacy
as a standard-setter for corporate law. 185 The state’s judges “take pride in keeping
up with business trends” and responding quickly and professionally to new
challenges. 186 Former Chancellor William Allen maintained in a 2000 speech that
“pride in the tradition of excellence and the importance that Delaware law has
played nationally act as an important non-economic incentive for judges who serve
under the light of national publicity to work hard and do their best.” 187 A Delaware
Chancery Court judge was quoted anonymously in a 2002 law review article as
saying Delaware judges are “driven by ‘pride and service,’” and “‘we believe that
we are doing something that ben efits all of society, and that it is important to do
this well.’” 188 Similarly, Vice Chancellor Laster drew attention in a 2011 ruling to
the Delaware courts’ expertise in corporate law and their corresponding
“comparative advantage” in resolving corporate suits. 189 The elite status of
Delaware judges, however, depends on their having a steady flow of cases to
resolve, particularly those that could generate important precedents or affect major
transactions. The out-of-Delaware trend puts that flow under threat and gives
Delaware’s judges an incentive to seek to channel cases back to Delaware.
Concerns about the Delaware bar provide the state’s judiciary with a second
reason to try to regain case flow. As Part II has shown, the raw number of cases
filed in Delaware has not dropped despite Delaware’s loss of litigation market
share. Instead, the erosion of Delaware’s market share has been roughly offset by a
greater total number of suits. Still, Delaware corporate litigators surely prefer not to
lose market share, and Delaware judges may be receptive to such concerns. 190
Potential tarnishing of the value of Delaware incorporation gives Delaware
judges a third reason to protect their “turf.” Extensive precedent, created and
interpreted by expert judges, is part of what Delaware “sells.” 191 As a 2001 article

185. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock (2005), supra note 11, at 1602–04, 1611; Simmons (2008),
supra note 17, at 1142–43.
186. Roe (2003), supra note 11, at 594.
187. William T. Allen, The Pride and the Hope of Delaware Corporate Law: Keynote
Address by the Honorable William T. Allen, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 70, 73 (2000).
188. Marcus Cole, “Delaware Is Not a State”: Are We Witnessing Jurisdictional
Competition in Bankruptcy?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1845, 1875 (2002).
189. Transcript of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction & the Court’s Ruling at
*15, In re Compellent Tech., Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6084–VCL (Del. Ch. Jan. 13,
2011).
190. Cf. Macey & Miller (1987), supra note 25, at 500 (indicating that Delaware judges
may be responsive to interest groups but to a lesser extent than legislators).
191. Supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
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entitled “Incorporate in Delaware? Yes” put it: “[T]he inability of other states to
actually create a judicial system as competent, as predictable, and as quick as
Delaware’s will always give Corporate America great pause when prodded to
incorporate elsewhere.” 192 A sustained loss of case flow could diminish Delaware’s
ability to charge a premium price for incorporations. As Douglas Branson has said
of Delaware, “Litigation and the flow of chancery and supreme court opinions
thereby produced actually generate the predictability hometown counsel and their
corporate manager clients desire.” 193
Mergers between public companies, going private transactions, and bankruptcies
steadily deplete the number of Delaware public companies, so Delaware needs a
steady flow of new incorporations to maintain its status as the primary home for
U.S. public companies. 194 If Delaware’s attractiveness as a venue for incorporation
diminishes, Nevada, Delaware’s closest (albeit distant) rival in the market for outof-state incorporations, 195 might become more popular. So might incorporating
locally. The Delaware judiciary reputedly is sensitive to signals generated by the
market for incorporation. 196 Hence, concerns about Delaware’s incorporation
market share could elicit an effort by Delaware’s judges to recapture litigation
market share.
There is no evidence yet that Delaware is losing incorporation business. Among
Fortune 500 companies, the proportion incorporated in Delaware in 2010 was 63%
as compared with 60% in 2005, and 76% of all 2010 initial public offerings were
by Delaware companies. 197 This should not be surprising, given that incorporating
in Delaware remains a safe, well-understood choice.
If an out-of-Delaware litigation trend did weaken Delaware’s stock of
precedents and thereby weakened its dominance in the market for incorporations,
Delaware could potentially respond by cutting the price it charges for
incorporations. Moreover, while a loss of litigation market share will affect
Delaware’s ability to generate new precedents, Delaware judges will still retain
considerable control over Delaware case law because the Delaware courts have the
final say on corporate law doctrine for Delaware companies. 198 Options backdating
suits illustrate the influence of Delaware decisions, even if few in number. While

192. John L. Reed & Frank E. Noyes, Incorporate in Delaware? Yes, DIRECTORS &
BOARDS, Winter 2001, at 33, 34.
193. Branson (1990), supra note 27, at 91.
194. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Shrinking Half-Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 125, 134, 139–40
(2009).
195. Michal Barzuza & David C. Smith, What Happens in Nevada? Self-Selecting into
Lax Law (Va. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 2011-08, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1644974.
196. Timothy P. Glynn, Delaware’s Vantagepoint: The Empire Strikes Back in the
Post-Post-Enron Era, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 105 (2008).
197. DEL. DEP’T OF STATE, DIV. OF CORPS., 2010 ANN. REP. 1 (2011), available at
http://corp.delaware.gov/10CorpAR.pdf; DEL. DEP’T OF STATE, DIV. OF CORPS., 2005 ANN.
REP. 1 (2006), available at http://corp.delaware.gov/2005%20doc%20ar.pdf.
198. Randy J. Holland, Delaware’s Business Courts: Litigation Leadership, 34 J. CORP.
L. 771, 781 (2009).
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plaintiffs’ lawyers largely bypassed Delaware when filing these suits, 199 legal
commentators analyzing options backdating devoted considerable attention to the
few Delaware decisions. 200 Moreover, with takeovers, many cases likely to
generate precedents are initiated by bidders rather than shareholders, and defense
counsel interviewees advised us that Delaware remains the principal locus for suits
by bidders. 201
While Delaware case law will remain highly influential for Delaware companies
even in suits brought outside Delaware, an out-of-Delaware trend could still reduce
the value of Delaware incorporation if non-Delaware judges or juries fail to apply
Delaware precedents as reliably as Delaware judges. 202 As Kenton King, a
litigation partner at Skadden Arps, a leading M&A firm, said in 2006: “What I tell
clients is that even though Delaware law is being applied, when it’s being applied
[outside Delaware], the predictability goes down.” 203
The out-of-Delaware trend could also generate muddled case law that reduces
the value of Delaware incorporation. Decisions by non-Delaware courts on
Delaware corporate law would not be binding, either on the Delaware courts or on
courts anywhere besides the court’s home jurisdiction. Nevertheless, such case law
might carry weight, especially where there was limited Delaware precedent. How
much weight would be anyone’s guess, but there remains a risk that fewer
Delaware-generated precedents will erode the benefits companies derive from
being incorporated in Delaware.
The case law on director good faith illustrates the potential importance of the
out-of-Delaware trend for case law precedents. The question of good faith is central
for the many Delaware public companies that have section 102(b)(7) charter
provisions, which eliminate directors’ monetary liability for breach of fiduciary
duty for actions taken in good faith. The Delaware courts have ruled that to
establish lack of good faith, plaintiffs must show either a conflict of interest or
“conscious disregard” of duty. 204 Whether conduct is egregious enough to violate
this standard is a recurring issue in corporate suits. As of yet, there is no Delaware

199. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
200. See Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch. 2007); Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d
908 (Del. Ch. 2007). For commentators focusing on these cases, see Abbott (2009), supra
note 61, at 604–17; Corporate Governance, MONDAQ, Aug. 3, 2007, at 1, available at 2007
WLNR 14910004; John L. Reed & Paul D. Brown, Corporate Governance Litigation: 2007
Review, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Summer 2008, at 16.
201. Our interviewees advised that for bidders, the Delaware judges’ expertise, ability to
act quickly, and lack of “home town bias” are critical factors. While Delaware courts are
sometimes reluctant to grant expedited discovery in suits by shareholders, see supra note 178
and accompanying text, they do grant it routinely for suits by bidders. See MacFadyen
(2010), supra note 51.
202. See Kamar (1998), supra note 27, at 1930.
203. Marcus (2006), supra note 94. King was a partner in Skadden Arps’s Palo Alto
office. Id.
204. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); Stone v. Ritter,
911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). Conscious disregard of duty is also relevant in assessing whether
plaintiffs can be excused, in a derivative case, from making demand on the board of directors
to bring the suit itself. See Andrew C.W. Lund, Rethinking Aronson: Board Authority and
Overdelegation, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 703, 720–23 (2009).
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case in which conscious disregard has been found, meaning there is little Delaware
guidance on which fact patterns might meet this standard. The leading cases finding
sufficient evidence of conscious disregard to withstand a motion to dismiss or a
motion for summary judgment are in fact two federal cases, Abbott Laboratories in
the Seventh Circuit and Pfizer in the Southern District of New York. 205
In Pfizer, the court rejected the defendants’ motion to dismiss a derivative suit
against the directors of Pfizer, a major pharmaceutical company incorporated in
Delaware. The suit alleged that the directors had consciously disregarded evidence
of widespread “off-label” drug marketing. Judge Rakoff found that the allegations
in the complaint, accepted as true in his ruling on the motion, established a
substantial likelihood that the Pfizer directors had deliberately disregarded “red
flags” suggesting illegal marketing practices and thus might not be protected by
Pfizer’s section 102(b)(7) charter provision. 206 It might be some time before the
Delaware courts face comparable facts—especially if plaintiffs’ lawyers often file
“conscious disregard” cases elsewhere.
B. Steps Delaware Judges Could Take to Reverse the Out-of-Delaware Trend
If Delaware judges become concerned with the out-of-Delaware trend, they
could take a number of steps to try to reverse it. These fall into two basic
categories: modifying the trends that have led plaintiffs’ attorneys to file elsewhere
and channeling multi-jurisdictional suits toward Delaware by encouraging other
courts to defer to Delaware in cases involving Delaware corporate law.
1. Making Delaware a More Plaintiff-Friendly Venue
Delaware courts, if they were inclined to seek to reverse the out-of-Delaware
trend, could backtrack on actions that have encouraged plaintiffs’ attorneys to file
elsewhere. First, given that attorneys’ fee cuts may have helped to prompt the outof-Delaware trend, 207 Delaware courts could move back toward their former feefriendly posture, at least for cases with significant financial recoveries. As law
professor Geoffrey Miller has observed, “Courts cannot engage in commentary if
they do not have cases, and attorneys will not bring cases if they do not anticipate a
fee.” 208 One can see a headline grabbing $300 million fee Chancellor Strine
awarded to plaintiffs’ attorneys in 2011 in the Southern Peru derivative litigation as
a strong move in this direction. 209

205. In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003); In re
Pfizer Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 722 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). One of us
(Black) was an expert witness for the plaintiffs in Pfizer.
206. In re Pfizer Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 722 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
The case settled before summary judgment.
207. See supra Part III.D.
208. Geoffrey P. Miller, A Modest Proposal for Fixing Delaware’s Broken Duty of Care,
2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 319, 335 (2010).
209. In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 30 A.3d 60 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(judgment on the merits), opinion revised and superseded, C.A. No. 961–CS, 2011 WL
6440761 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2011), enforced, C.A. No. 961–CS, 2011 WL 6382006 (Del.Ch.
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Second, the Delaware courts could revisit their decision to discard the first-tofile custom and consider speedy filing as a positive factor in contests between
plaintiffs’ attorneys to be named lead counsel. The Delaware courts could still
disregard a fast but sloppy complaint and reward a careful, later-filed complaint, or
one filed by a firm with a client with large dollars at stake, with a co-lead counsel
role. Even this sort of partial reversal would give firms with good lawyers, albeit
lacking a large institutional client or a track record in Delaware courts, a fighting
chance.
Third, the Delaware courts could revisit their reluctance to provide expedited
discovery. Doing so would move Delaware toward the median of other states and
thus cancel out one of the main advantages to filing elsewhere. A grant of
expedited discovery would remain discretionary, and the Delaware courts could
limit the scope of discovery on a case-by-case basis to reduce the burden on
defendants.
Fourth, a change in rhetoric could help. Plaintiffs’ lawyers do not like to be told
that the Delaware courts have “deep concerns about the agency costs imposed by
plaintiffs’ attorneys” (Strine in Cox Communications) or that most takeover cases
are “worthless” (Laster in Nighthawk Radiology). 210 Conversely, judicial
statements emphasizing the value of shareholder suits as a check on wayward or
self-dealing managers could, at the margin, attract more cases.
Finally, Delaware courts could adjust the aspects of Delaware law that could
lead plaintiffs’ counsel to file strong cases elsewhere. For example, they could
revisit the current “demand” doctrine in derivative suits, under which a plaintiff
who makes demand on the board to sue the corporation’s directors or officers
concedes the independence of the board. 211 Predictably, almost no plaintiff ever
makes demand. Some plaintiffs may currently file outside Delaware hoping for a
friendlier court ruling on whether demand should be excused, even though the
verbal standard for excusing demand is nominally the same. Delaware could
preclude these suits from being filed elsewhere by adopting the Model Business
Corporation Act approach, under which plaintiffs must make demand on the board,
but are not disadvantaged by having done so. 212
2. Discouraging Other Courts from Hearing Cases Involving Delaware Companies
When suits involving Delaware companies are filed in more than one location,
the Delaware courts have a second strategy they can adopt to increase Delaware’s
control of corporate cases—they can encourage courts elsewhere to defer to
Delaware. Delaware courts indeed are already quite willing to protect their “turf”
against other courts. Delaware courts, for instance, are unlikely to grant a
defendant’s forum non conveniens motion in Delaware in favor of another state
court in a corporate suit involving a Delaware company. The standard deployed is

Dec. 20, 2011) (fee award; fee award has been appealed to Delaware Supreme Court). On
the fee, see Gina Chon & Joe Palazzolo, An Early Christmas for These Lawyers—$300
Million in Fees for Shareholder Case Sets Off Debate, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2011, at C1.
210. See supra notes 92 and 98 and accompanying text.
211. Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 775 (Del. 1990).
212. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2008).
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“overwhelming hardship,” 213 which is difficult to show because under Delaware’s
“long arm” statute, directors and officers of Delaware companies consent to
personal jurisdiction, 214 and because Wilmington, where the Chancery Court is
located, is only about thirty minutes from a major airport in Philadelphia.
Delaware courts have also proved reluctant to grant a stay or a forum non
conveniens motion in favor of another court when a suit was filed first in the other
court. 215 Three cases discussed above, In re IBP, Inc., Shareholders Litigation,
Biondi v. Scrushy, and Rosen v. Wind River Systems, illustrate the point. In each,
the Chancery Court declined to stay or dismiss suits arising under Delaware
corporate law, noting the presence of novel issues of Delaware law or the better
framing of the Delaware complaint. 216
Additional cases illustrate the Delaware courts’ reluctance to cede jurisdiction.
In Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology, cases arising from a takeover had been filed in
Delaware and Arizona, there had been a hearing in Delaware, and a settlement of
the Arizona suit was thereafter proposed. 217 When the Arizona settlement was
drawn to Vice Chancellor Laster’s attention, he expressed strong concern with it,
because the only relief was additional disclosure by the companies involved. He
ordered that the Delaware case files be sent to the Arizona court so that the Arizona
judge could consider them in deciding whether to approve the settlement.
In another takeover case, Parcell v. Southwall Technologies, complaints were
filed in Delaware and California state court. 218 On a motion by one of the
defendants, Vice Chancellor Laster declined to stay the Delaware case but also
declined to order expedite proceedings in Delaware. He maintained in so doing
“that the one forum on these types of recurrent facts should be Delaware,” 219
commenting that the Delaware courts “necessarily have a moderate comparative
advantage in adjudicating [Delaware] law.” 220
VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc. provides an additional
illustration of Delaware judges’ willingness to protect their turf. 221 The Delaware
Supreme Court held that Delaware law governed a dispute over a shareholder vote
in a Delaware-incorporated, California-based firm, despite a California statutory
provision specifically on point, and stressed the duty of other courts, under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, to respect the corporate law of the
state of incorporation. The decision has been interpreted as a signal to the Chancery

213. Berger v. Intelident Solutions, Inc., 906 A.2d 134, 135 (Del. 2006); Stevelman
(2009), supra note 10, 104–07.
214. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 3114(a)–(b) (Supp. 2010).
215. Stevelman (2009), supra note 10, at 108–18 (reviewing the case law).
216. See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text.
217. Courtroom Status Conference, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, C.A. No.
5890–VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2010). This case is discussed supra notes 98–107 and
accompanying text.
218. Teleconference, Parcell v. Southwall Techs., Inc., C.A. No. 7003–VCL (Del. Ch.
Nov. 7, 2011).
219. Id. at *15.
220. Id. at *11–*12.
221. VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005).
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Court to preserve the Delaware courts’ role in cases involving inter-jurisdictional
conflicts. 222
The Delaware courts do not have to be confrontational as they interact with
other courts. They can also seek cooperation from judges elsewhere, signaling in so
doing that they are willing to defer when a case filed in Delaware turns on federal
law or the law of another state. Chancellor Chandler, in a 2011 ruling involving
Allion Healthcare, Inc., suggested, for instance, that defense counsel could file
motions “asking the judges in each jurisdiction to confer with one another and
agree upon where the case should go forward.” 223 His observations have
encouraged counsel to bring such “one forum” motions in subsequent cases. 224
Chancellor Chandler’s proposal requires defense counsel to take the initiative.
Moreover, even if they do so, non-Delaware judges may still be reluctant to defer
to Delaware courts with a case of local import. 225 Mark Lebovitch, Jerry Silk, and
Jeremy Friedman, lawyers with the Bernstein, Litowitz plaintiffs’ firm, have
proposed in the M&A context a more elaborate scheme designed to channel
litigation to Delaware courts. 226 They propose that the Delaware Chancery Court
require the first plaintiff to file a complaint against a merger in the Chancery Court
to publish national notice of the action. The notice would trigger a 10 day period
during which any other plaintiffs’ firm interested in challenging the transaction
could submit a case management plan that explained why its shareholder-lawyer
pair should be named lead plaintiff and lead counsel. The Chancery Court would
then apply the TCW Technology factors to choose the lead plaintiff and lead
counsel for the Delaware suit. Lebovitch, Silk, and Friedman predict that judges
elsewhere would often defer to Delaware courts with this framework in place
because the judges would surmise that a firm filing in their court had chosen not to
participate in an “open and transparent leadership process,” and could expect
Delaware’s courts to cede jurisdiction in appropriate cases by staying the Delaware
action. 227
C. Will the Delaware Courts Seek to Regain Market Share?
While there are a number of steps the Delaware courts could take to regain case
flow market share, for various reasons we spell out now, it cannot be taken for
granted that Delaware courts will take any of these steps.

222. Stevelman (2009), supra note 10, at 88; Glynn (2008), supra note 196, at 137.
223. In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S’holders Litig, C.A. No. 5022–CC, 2011 WL 1135016,
at *4 n.12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011).
224. See supra note 38 and accompanying text; Micheletti & Parker (2012), supra note
10, at 34–35.
225. David Marcus, The Chancellor’s Proposal, DEAL MAG., Apr. 25, 2011,
http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/039137/2011/the-chancellors-proposal.php.
226. Lebovitch, Silk & Friedman (2011), supra note 78.
227. Id. at 8.
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1. The Reaction of Delaware Companies
If the Delaware courts seek to regain litigation market share, a major concern
would be the reaction of Delaware companies. How, to return to the title of this
Article, can Delaware balance a manager-friendly approach, which will attract and
retain incorporations, with a stance sufficiently friendly to plaintiffs’ lawyers to
attract shareholder lawsuits?
Historically, Delaware succeeded in attracting both managers and plaintiffs’
lawyers. Correspondingly, it might be thought that the Delaware courts could
readily backtrack from steps that have jeopardized their popularity among
plaintiffs’ attorneys without losing incorporation market share. Nevertheless,
adoption of an explicitly litigation-friendly posture by Delaware judges could make
corporate managers uneasy. As Douglas Branson has observed, “Overly generous
fee awards and excessive litigation . . . unduly burden corporate treasuries and are
inimical to longer term shareholder interests.” 228
At the same time, many Delaware companies might not respond too adversely to
some steps that the Delaware courts could take. Suppose, for example, that
Delaware became more “fee-friendly” in cases where plaintiffs’ lawyers achieve a
significant recovery while remaining niggardly on fees for “disclosure-only”
settlements in cases arising from arm’s length takeovers. The message to plaintiffs’
lawyers might be, “to obtain a real fee, obtain a real recovery.” The Southern Peru,
case discussed above, in which the court awarded a $300 million fee for a $2
billion recovery, fits this pattern.
How might shareholders and corporate directors react if Delaware courts do
become more generous in awarding fees in cases with large dollar recoveries?
Institutional shareholders might like such an arrangement. Many directors would
prefer no suits and no fees, but might not object too strongly. The Delaware courts,
by rewarding only real recoveries, would be discouraging “file on every deal”
lawsuits, even if this only meant that the suits were filed elsewhere.
Delaware companies might also not object much to changes to the approach
used for selection of lead counsel. If Delaware judges gave greater weight to early
filing when resolving lead counsel disputes, defendants might welcome a modestly
resourced rapid filer as lead opposing counsel. Delaware firms might also not
object to easier plaintiff access to expedited discovery in Delaware, given the likely
alternative of expedited discovery elsewhere, supervised by a less knowledgeable
judge. And a change in rhetorical tone, unless accompanied by a significant change
in substantive outcomes, should not materially disadvantage Delaware companies
or their directors. Correspondingly, so long as the Delaware courts do not reverse
field too dramatically, they likely could move in a litigation-friendly direction
without jeopardizing Delaware’s popularity for incorporations.
2. Reputational Concerns
If the Delaware courts take steps to bring back case flow, they will need to be
sensitive about how they do so. Aggressive efforts to recapture market share could

228. Branson (1990), supra note 27, at 102.
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jeopardize their reputation as elite, national arbiters of corporate law. Past efforts
by the Delaware courts to assert control over cases with multi-jurisdictional filings
illustrate the point. Commentators have described attempts by Delaware courts to
obtain or retain jurisdiction in corporate law cases as “transparently selfinterested” 229 and termed the constitutional law analysis in VantagePoint
“gratuitous” and an example of “remarkable overbreadth.” 230 Likewise, after Vice
Chancellor Laster indicated in Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings Inc. that the
lead defense litigator, David Berger, might lose his pro hac vice right to appear in
Delaware, various litigators described the judge’s treatment of Berger as unfair. 231
If Delaware implemented Lebovitch, Silk, and Friedman’s proposal that
plaintiffs’ attorneys file M&A claims in Delaware courts within a specified time,
the reaction might be similar. Plaintiffs’ lawyers who knew they were unlikely to
gain lead counsel status in Delaware and thus did not file there, might complain to
their preferred court about the Delaware courts’ exclusionary tactics as part of an
effort to persuade that court to retain jurisdiction. More generally, as the special
counsel appointed in Scully noted in his 2011 report, “There is also the danger that
an attempt by a single court to solve these multi-jurisdictional issues will be
resisted by other courts or avoided by litigants.” 232
3. Resource Constraints
The discussion above assumes that the Delaware judges want to recapture
market share and asks whether and how they can do so. But perhaps they will not
want many of the cases they are losing. The Delaware judges’ turn against the firstto-file presumption, their fee cuts, and their rhetorical tone reflect a sense that many
current suits should not be brought. This may be a reasonable reaction. A securities
litigator has described the business model of some plaintiffs’ firms as “a numbers
game. The contingency fees [for M&A suits] are actually pretty small . . . , so the
business model is based on the volume of payouts.” 233 For Delaware judges
recapturing control of high-volume, low-expected payout suits may be an
unappetizing prospect. For these cases, managing the case load is often largely an
administrative function, involving little more than addressing motions to expedite
discovery and approving proposed settlements. These cases may also do little to
develop Delaware’s case law.
Concerns about scarce judicial resources could reinforce reluctance among
Delaware judges to recapture litigation market share. There are only five Delaware
Court of Chancery judges, and they have limited capacity to deal with new cases,
even if much of the work is administrative. To be sure, the number of Chancery
court judges could be increased, but that could be unattractive to the sitting judges
because it would dilute their influence and might decrease the overall coherence of

229. Glynn (2008), supra note 196, at 118.
230. Stevelman (2009), supra note 10, at 88.
231. David Marcus, Multiforum Mayhem, DEAL MAG., Jan. 21, 2011,
http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/038069/2011/multiforum-mayhem.php.
232. Brief of Special Counsel Gregory P. Williams, at 32, Scully v. Nighthawk
Radiology Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 5890–VCL (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2011).
233. MacFadyen (2010), supra note 51.
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Delaware law. Indeed, if tough regulation of attorneys’ fees and a distaste for hasty
filers primarily discouraged weak claims, the Delaware judges might happily
sacrifice litigation market share and devote the judicial resources available to the
complicated cases where their expertise would be most valuable.
A key question, then, is whether Delaware is losing good cases as well as bad.
The likely answer is at least sometimes “yes,” as illustrated by our options
backdating cases. Our lawyer-interviewees viewed many of these cases as strong,
yet the vast majority were filed outside Delaware. 234 The judgment about claim
strength was confirmed by some sizeable settlements. Among our 165 companies
facing options backdating derivative suits, 52 resulted in a cash settlement, with
aggregate payments of nearly $2.1 billion. 235 Settlements of $900 million involving
UnitedHealth Group (incorporated in Minnesota) and $600 million involving
Cardinal Health (incorporated in Ohio) accounted for more than half of this total. 236
There were, however, 14 other options backdating cases with settlements of $10
million or more, 10 involving Delaware companies. In only one of these 10 cases,
involving NVIDIA Corp., was a suit brought in Delaware. A suit against NVIDIA
was also brought in California; the two suits were settled together.
The fact that a number of the most cited Delaware corporate cases, such as
Aronson v. Lewis, 237 Weinberger v. UOP, 238 and Kahn v. Lynch
Communications, 239 were brought by individuals who were “professional”
plaintiffs owning only a few shares also implies Delaware’s current approach could
be costing Delaware good cases as well as bad. Could the lawyers who brought
these cases have found institutional clients and secured a lead counsel role under
Delaware’s current approach? There is no way to know, but the answer might often
be no, meaning that these potentially important cases might today be filed and
heard outside Delaware. 240
Even major plaintiffs’ firms that have the professional reputations and
institutional clients likely to yield lead counsel appointments in Delaware may
bring some of their “good” cases elsewhere. In our interviews with plaintiffs’
lawyers a number stressed that they treat filing in Delaware as a serious option but
may well choose to file elsewhere, with the choice turning on a number of factors.

234. See supra Part II.B.4.
235. This is a lower bound on the number of settlements with payments. Our principal
source for many of the settlements was the company’s disclosure in its 10-K annual report.
Companies need only disclose “material pending legal proceedings,” 17 CFR § 229.103
(2011); SEC Regulation S-K Item 103. A fair number of companies in our dataset disclosed
the lawsuit but did not disclose the outcome.
236. For details on these settlements, see Kevin M. LaCroix, UnitedHealth Derivative
Settlement “Largest Ever,” D&O DIARY (Dec. 6, 2007),
http://www.dandodiary.com/2007/12/articles/options-backdating/unitedhealth-derivativesettlement-largest-ever/ (UnitedHealth); Kevin M. LaCroix, More Options Backdating
DIARY
(May
16,
2007),
Lawsuit
Dismissals
and
Settlements,
D&O
http://www.dandodiary.com/2007/05/articles/options-backdating/more-options-backdatinglawsuit-dismissals-and-settlements/ (Cardinal Health).
237. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984)
238. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983)
239. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
240. See Quinn (2011), supra note 10, at 24.
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When they file elsewhere, sometimes the cases will be strong ones. Indeed, the
plaintiffs’ lawyers we interviewed emphasized that it is often hard to know how
strong a case they have at the time of filing. Accordingly, when major plaintiffs’
firms sue outside Delaware, Delaware likely loses at least some good cases.
Various features of Delaware litigation likely encourage major plaintiffs’ firms
to file outside Delaware. The fact that Delaware courts have chopped fees in some
cases with large recoveries 241 will be one factor, perhaps a large one if the lawyers
think they might receive more elsewhere. Some of our interviewees cited the antiplaintiffs’-lawyer rhetoric of some Delaware cases as a reason to avoid Delaware,
even if it has not (yet) been directed at them.
Also, when plaintiffs’ lawyers suffer adverse outcomes in Delaware, they may
attribute the setbacks to anti-plaintiff bias, rightly or wrongly. Vice Chancellor
Laster’s remarks in a 2011 takeover case concerning plaintiffs’ lawyer Richard
Brualdi illustrate how encounters with Delaware judges can dissuade plaintiffs’
lawyers from suing in Delaware. Vice Chancellor Laster observed that Brualdi had
not been eager to come back to Delaware after Vice Chancellor Lamb had declined
to approve a settlement in a case where Brualdi was lead counsel on the basis that
he had failed to represent the interests of the class adequately. 242 Or as one lawyer,
who has obtained large recoveries in Delaware, said to us in 2011 about a hearing
outcome: “After yesterday’s joke of a [Delaware] hearing in my [name deleted]
case, you better believe [I’ll be interested in] suing outside of Delaware so [my
clients] get a fair shake!” 243
The upshot is that the out-of-Delaware trend is likely causing Delaware courts to
lose both “good” and “bad” cases. Conversely, an effort to recapture market share
will likely mean that the Delaware courts would face a higher volume of both types
of cases, a potentially unappealing prospect due to resource constraints.
4. Efforts to Recapture Market Share May Fail
Assume now that Delaware judges, having taken into account possible
reputational damage and resource constraints, are convinced a loss of “market
share” with respect to cases filed is seriously detrimental to Delaware’s interests
and are inclined to seek to correct matters. A final obstacle to proceeding would be
that their efforts might not succeed, or might have only a modest effect, especially
in the near term. Plaintiffs’ attorneys, having had their or their brethren’s motives
impugned with some regularity, might not quickly forgive and again take their
chances by filing in Delaware. Similarly, given Delaware’s record in cutting fee
requests in both good cases and bad, it may take a period in which awards for cases
with real recoveries are comparable to what plaintiffs’ counsel could expect
elsewhere before counsel will trust their fate on this issue, so crucial for them, to
the Delaware courts. With regard to expedited discovery, a change in the Delaware

241. See supra Part III.D.
242. Teleconference at *13–*14, Parcell v. Southwall Techs., Inc., C.A. No. 7003–VCL
(Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 2011).
243. This lawyer is among those who advised us that his firm decides on a case by case
basis whether to file in Delaware or elsewhere.
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court rules might well be needed to convince plaintiffs’ lawyers that this will be as
readily available to them in Delaware as elsewhere.
V. OTHER POTENTIAL RESPONSES TO THE OUT-OF-DELAWARE TREND
While it is unclear which steps, if any, the Delaware judiciary will take to
reverse or limit the migration of corporate cases out of Delaware, or how well any
judicial efforts would succeed, Delaware companies, the Delaware legislature or
Congress perhaps could take steps that could reverse or limit the out-of-Delaware
trend.
A. Self-Help by Delaware Companies
Delaware companies and their lawyers have various strategies they can adopt to
influence venue. One possibility is to respond ex post by bringing a stay, dismissal,
or one forum motion to try to channel litigation to a preferred jurisdiction. 244
Another, and the one focused on here, is for companies to act ex ante and adopt
charter or bylaw provisions specifying Delaware as the exclusive forum for
shareholder claims against directors.
Delaware is a popular forum among many lawyers who advise public
companies. For example, Stephen Radin, a senior litigation partner at Weil, Gotshal
& Manges, said of the Delaware Court of Chancery in a 2004 interview: “It is a
great court. There is a Chancellor and four Vice Chancellors. Each is expert in
corporate law. I wish more of my practice was in Delaware.” 245 Similarly, Kenton
King of Skadden Arps said in 2006 with regard to other courts applying Delaware
law heard outside Delaware: “What I tell clients is that even though Delaware law
is being applied, when it’s being applied by a bench that doesn’t have as much
familiarity with these cases, the predictability goes down . . . .” 246 Lawyers who
believe that litigating in Delaware serves their corporate clients’ interests could
urge those clients to adopt charter or bylaw provisions selecting Delaware as the
exclusive forum for litigation. When Wachtell Lipton partner Ted Mirvis drew
attention to the out-of-Delaware trend in 2007 that was his proposed cure. 247 Vice
Chancellor Laster endorsed forum selection clauses in Revlon in 2010. 248 At least
one law firm thereafter told clients in the wake of the Revlon decision that a forum
selection clause was the new “must” for Delaware companies. 249

244. See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text.
245. A Corporate Governance Practitioner on the Delaware Courts, METROPOLITAN
CORP. COUNS., Nov. 2004, at 47.
246. Marcus (2006), supra note 66.
247. Anywhere but Chancery (2007), supra note 1.
248. In re Revlon Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (2010) (“If boards of directors
and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and valuepromoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with charter
provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”).
249. Latham & Watkins, Designating Delaware’s Court of Chancery as the Exclusive
Jurisdiction for Intra-Corporate Disputes: A New ‘Must’ for Delaware Company Charter or
GOVERNANCE
COMMENT.,
Apr.
2010,
available
at
Bylaws,
CORP.
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Delaware-only forum selection clauses are becoming more common. 250 One
study found that the number of Delaware firms that had adopted or proposed such
provisions grew from 82 as of April 2011 to 195 by year-end. 251 The Revlon
decision appears to have generated momentum in favor of forum selection clauses,
as only 16 forum selection provisions had been adopted before it. 252 The growth in
multi-forum litigation could, over time, prompt even more companies to seek to
adopt forum selection clauses.
Even if managers of Delaware companies—or, in practice, their lawyers—
become persuaded that a Delaware-only forum selection clause is a good idea, this
might not greatly affect the out-of-Delaware trend. Stockholder resistance is one
potential obstacle. Even institutional shareholders who respect the expertise of the
Delaware judiciary could balk at giving up their current freedom to choose to sue
elsewhere. Institutional investors that partner with some regularity with plaintiffs’
law firms—particularly public pension funds 253—could be especially wary about
being tied down in this way.
The enforceability of a Delaware forum selection provision is also uncertain.
Traditionally, state and federal courts refused to enforce forum selection clauses in
contract disputes, reasoning that these terms were void as against public policy
because courts were being ousted of their jurisdiction. 254 However, in 1972 the
United States Supreme Court held in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. that
forum selection clauses are prima facie valid and should be upheld unless the
resisting party could show enforcement would be unreasonable under the
circumstances. 255 A judge asked to determine the enforceability of a Delaware
forum selection provision could accept, as Delaware courts do, that a corporation’s
charter and bylaws are analogous to a contract, 256 and honor the provision. But this
is far from certain.

http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub3510_1.pdf.
250. See Lewis (2008), supra note 10, at 202–03.
251. Claudia H. Allen, Study of Delaware Forum Selection in Charters and Bylaws,
NEAL, GERBER & EISENBERG LLP, Jan. 25, 2012, available at http://www.ngelaw.com/
pubs/uniEntity.aspx?xpST=PubDetail&pub=623 (provides URL link to request complete
study).
252. Grundfest (2010), supra note 7, at 3, 7.
253. Some law firms even make campaign contributions to public pension officials
seeking re-election. See, for example, Mark Maremont, Tom McGinty & Nathan Koppel,
Trial Lawyers Contribute, Shareholder Suits Follow, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703837004575013633550087098.html.
254. Walter W. Heiser, Forum Selection Clauses in State Courts: Limitations on
Enforcement After Stewart and Carnival Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REV. 361, 366–67 (1993).
255. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). This holding was limited
to admiralty jurisdiction and international commercial contracts, but lower federal courts and
state courts in many jurisdictions have applied the reasoning in other contexts. See Heiser
(1993), supra note 254, at 363, 367–72.
256. Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928 (Del. 1990)
(“Corporate charters and by-laws are contracts among the shareholders of a corporation and
the general rules of contract interpretation are held to apply.”); Jackson Walker LLP v. Spira
Footware, Inc., C.A. No. 3150–VCP, 2008 WL 2487256, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 23, 2008) (“A
company’s bylaws are contractual in nature.”).
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Some forum selection provisions do not require cases to be brought in Delaware
courts but instead give a board the choice to remove a case to Delaware or not. 257
Courts outside Delaware might balk at giving the defendants in a lawsuit that
degree of discretion. Moreover, some forum-selection clauses are bylaws, adopted
unilaterally by boards of directors. 258 This weakens the analogy to contracts, and
the lack of shareholder consent might give pause to some courts. Courts would be
more likely to respect a Delaware-only charter provision because amendments to a
corporate charter must be approved by the shareholders. 259
The limited case law indicates that the enforceability of forum selection
provisions cannot be taken for granted. In Galaviz v. Berg, the Northern District of
California declined to enforce a Delaware-only bylaw adopted by the Oracle
Corporation board. 260 The court declined to treat the bylaw in question as being
akin to a contractual term, reasoning that the directors had acted unilaterally
without shareholder consent, but did suggest that there would be a stronger case for
honoring a venue provision in a corporate charter. 261
One might also question whether a Delaware-only venue provision, even if in a
corporate charter, would be enforced if a case is brought in federal court that
includes both state claims and federal claims, most likely under federal securities
law. In those instances the Delaware courts will usually lack subject matter
jurisdiction over the federal claims. 262 Would the federal court be willing to dismiss
the corporate law claims, thus forcing the plaintiffs to proceed in two jurisdictions
instead of one? The answer is unknown. The enforceability in federal court of
agreements compelling litigation to proceed in state court, especially if the claims
could be combined with an ongoing federal suit, is a complex issue that has
received little academic attention. 263
B. Delaware Legislation
The Delaware legislature conceivably could intervene directly to encourage
corporate suits to proceed in Delaware. There have been previous instances where
the Delaware legislature has facilitated litigation before the Delaware courts. For
example, Delaware has given other state and federal courts, as well as the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the right to certify questions of Delaware
law to the Delaware Supreme Court, which will resolve them. 264 Likewise, in 2003

257. Grundfest (2010), supra note 7, at 6 (indicating that 8 of 25 forum selection
provisions studied were “elective” and gave the board ex post discretion on whether to
compel litigation to occur in the state of incorporation or allow it to proceed in another state.
The others were mandatory, so litigation had to proceed in the state of incorporation.).
258. Id. at 6, 19 (Nine of the 25 forum selection provisions studied were by-laws.).
259. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2010).
260. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
261. Id. at 1174–75.
262. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006) (giving the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over these
claims).
263. See Michael D. Moberly, Judicial Protection of Forum Selection: Enforcing Private
Agreements to Litigate in State Court, 1 PHOENIX L. REV. 1, 4, 55 (2008).
264. DEL. SUP. CT. R. 41; Henry duPont Ridgely, Avoiding the Thickets of Guesswork:
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Delaware’s expanded its “long arm” statute, under which directors of Delaware
firms are deemed to consent to personal jurisdiction in Delaware, to officers as
well. 265
Going forward the Delaware legislature could, as Brian Quinn has suggested,
amend Delaware corporate law to authorize companies to include Delaware-only
forum selection clauses in their charters for suits against officers or directors. 266
This would not guarantee that another court would honor such a charter
amendment, but might make this outcome more likely. The legislature could
additionally encourage Chancery Court judges to promote litigation in Delaware
courts by increasing the number of vice-chancellors, thus reducing the burden on
each. It could also expand plaintiff rights to expedited discovery, at least in timesensitive takeover cases. The possibilities are many. Even more so than for
responses by the courts, one can only speculate on what the legislature might do,
and how effective any action would be.
C. Federal Reform
The out-of-Delaware trend could also elicit a federal response. For instance, the
New York City Bar Association’s Committee on Securities Litigation has proposed
federal reforms that would limit multi-jurisdictional corporate litigation by
channeling suits to the state of incorporation—hence often to Delaware. 267 But one
can also imagine federal reform that would largely sideline the Delaware courts, at
least in shareholder class action suits. Recall that SLUSA contains a so-called
“Delaware carve-out” from general provisions that preempt state securities class
actions. 268 The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, which permits defendants to
remove state class actions to federal court, contains a similar exception for class
actions under corporate law. 269 Delaware courts dealing with corporate litigation
were assumed, contrary to the general trend with state courts, to offer a safe pair of
hands that rendered unnecessary a diversion of these suits to the federal courts. 270
With many corporate class actions now being filed in state courts other than
Delaware, the justification for the carve-out is weakened. One plausible federal
response would be to limit the carve-out to shareholder class actions brought in the
state of incorporation. Such a change would mean lawsuits of this type involving
Delaware companies would have to be brought in Delaware courts, which would
help to reverse the out-of-Delaware trend. Another possibility would be to
eliminate the carve-out entirely. This would channel shareholder class actions to

The Delaware Supreme Court and Certified Questions of Corporate Law, 63 SMU L. REV.
1127, 1131–32 (2010); see also DEL. CONST. art. IV, 11(8). The certification power was
created in 1984 and extended to the SEC in 2007. duPont Ridgley (2010), supra, at 1131.
265. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114(b) (Supp. 2010).
266. Quinn (2011), supra note 10, at 38–43; see also Stevelman (2009), supra note 10, at
135; Micheletti & Parker (2012), supra note 10, at 36–37.
267. COMMITTEE ON SECURITIES LITIGATION (2008), supra note 68, at 9.
268. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
269. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 5, 119 Stat. 4, 13 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1453(d)(2)–(3) (2006)).
270. See Johnson (2012), supra note 10, at 53; Strine (2001), supra note 14, at 1257,
1273.
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federal courts and be a blow to Delaware. The desirability of such changes would
depend to a considerable degree on whether the out-of-Delaware trend is beneficial,
the topic to which we turn next.
VI. THE PROS AND CONS OF THE OUT-OF-DELAWARE TREND
We have thus far assessed the likely reasons for the out-of-Delaware trend, and
how various actors might respond. We turn in this Part to a brief and tentative
assessment of whether the trend is likely to be good or bad for shareholders, who in
large measure bear whatever costs and earn whatever benefits come with the
uniquely American practice of frequent shareholder litigation. 271 We assume
initially that there will not be a major erosion of Delaware’s incorporation market
share and focus on forum shopping.
A. The Mixed Implications of Forum Shopping
Forum shopping sounds unsavory, and is often denounced on the grounds that it
allows litigants to manipulate lawsuit outcomes. 272 There is also an obvious
inefficiency if suits are filed in more than one jurisdiction. 273 As Chancellor Strine
said about multi-jurisdictional M&A litigation at a 2011 conference on Delaware
courts and corporate law, “These are suits about a single transaction where one
authoritative and timely ruling is required. Competing proceedings are not only
inefficient, but bad for investors and our economy.” 274 Yet forum shopping can also
be thought of more charitably from a market perspective. Litigants, under this
analogy, constitute the demand side, judges constitute the supply side, and the
competitive discipline imposed by litigant choice can improve the quality and
speed of judicial decision-making. 275
To take a concrete example, it is plausible that expedited discovery in M&A
suits, followed by a preliminary injunction hearing well before the shareholder
meeting to vote on the merger, imposes useful discipline on the merging parties,
even if most suits generate no financial recoveries. Currently, however, expedited
discovery is not reliably available in Delaware. 276 Out-of-state filings put pressure
on Delaware to grant expedited discovery more liberally. Thus, forum shopping

271. See generally John Armour, Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Richard Nolan,
Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the United Kingdom
and United States, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 687 (2009) (contrasting the litigation-rates in
the United States and Britain).
272. See, e.g., Bassett (2006), supra note 35, at 388; Forum Shopping Reconsidered,
supra note 35, at 1680.
273. Johnson (2012), supra note 10, at 44–47 (making this point for takeover suits);
Quinn (2011), supra note 10, at 5, 9; COMMITTEE ON SECURITIES LITIGATION (2008), supra
note 68, at 9.
274. The Dramatic Increase in M&A Litigation, DAILY DEAL, Nov. 28, 2011,
http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/043019/commentary/the-dramatic-increase-in-m&alitigation.php.
275. Zywicki (2006), supra note 108, at 1146–47.
276. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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may generate more benefits than costs in this instance. To assess the benefits and
costs of forum shopping for other types of corporate lawsuits, one must study the
institutional context in which each arises. This is no easy task, and would likely fail
to yield definitive conclusions. 277
B. Quality of Judicial Decision-Making
Given the respect widely accorded to the Delaware Chancery Court, one might
think that if many cases are filed elsewhere, the average quality of judicial
decision-making in corporate cases will decline. The Delaware judiciary’s
familiarity with business dynamics, reinforced by a steady flow of corporate cases,
may well be lacking elsewhere. 278 The United States could also lose the de facto
national corporate law it presently benefits from. As Chancellor Strine said in In re
Topps Co. Shareholders Litigation, the “important coherence-generating benefits”
of Delaware courts will be at risk if “decisions are instead routinely made by a
variety of state and federal judges who only deal episodically with our law.” 279 Yet
there could be countervailing gains from sizeable numbers of corporate cases
involving Delaware companies being filed elsewhere.
One consideration is that judges elsewhere may in some instances develop
expertise akin to that present in Delaware. For example, many corporate suits are
brought in the Complex Case Division of the Santa Clara County Superior Court.
This small (three judges) court has correspondingly developed considerable
familiarity with corporate cases, many of which involve Delaware law. 280 So too
for judges on specialized business courts in some other states, and for federal
district court judges—notably in the Northern District of California and the
Southern District of New York—who regularly hear corporate and securities cases.
Just as Delaware Court of Chancery judges take pride in their expertise, and
surely like to be involved in important cases, so, at least potentially, do judges
elsewhere. Some of those judges may compete to receive major cases. The
Delaware judges will also need to compete to keep case flow. Is that competition
for good or ill? There is no clear answer, but there may well be circumstances
where rulings from outside Delaware could impose a salutary discipline on the
development of Delaware case law. This could be the case with director liability,
for example.
A case can be made that independent directors acting honestly should face some
risk of personal liability for severe dereliction of duty, even without self-dealing. 281

277. Zywicki (2006), supra note 108, at 1148, 1157–60 (concluding after examining
Delaware corporate law that it is unclear whether forum shopping is a good or bad thing).
278. Klausner (1995), supra note 16, at 845–46 (“[O]nce a judge is appointed, his or her
performance in the corporate law area . . . will depend at least in part on the number of
corporate law cases the court hears.”).
279. In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 959 (Del. Ch. 2007).
280. Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Restricting Shareholder Derivative Suits to
Delaware: Stop, Look and Listen (Jan. 2011), http://www.wsgr.com/publications/
PDFSearch/wsgralert_delaware_shareholder_derivative_suits.pdf.
281. For the views of two of us, see Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner,
Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006); Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins &

1398

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 87:1345

As we have seen, however, Delaware courts have adopted a tough “conscious
disregard of duty” standard for a plaintiff to show director lack of good faith at
companies which have adopted Section 102(b)(7) charter provisions to eliminate
director liability absent self-dealing or lack of good faith. The Delaware courts
have never found the “conscious disregard” standard to have been met. Currently,
the leading cases finding evidence sufficient (or, on a motion to dismiss, potentially
sufficient) to meet the standard come instead from outside Delaware. 282 Could the
judgments of other courts on what meets this standard prompt a beneficial change
of approach by Delaware courts? If independent directors face a somewhat greater
risk of personal liability if a case involving a Delaware company is heard outside
Delaware, is that good or bad? The answers to these questions are by no means
clear. Still, as this example suggests, forum competition may in some
circumstances have a beneficial impact on the quality of judicial decision-making,
even if Delaware courts have the final say in developing precedents.
C. Impact on the Delaware Brand
We have pointed out that while a loss of litigation market share by Delaware
could cause a significant loss in market share for incorporations, it is unclear
whether this will occur. Still, suppose the loss of litigation market share would lead
to some long-term weakening of Delaware’s market share for incorporations. That
would be a bad outcome for Delaware’s tax base and its in-state lawyers and
judges, but would it occasion a broader social loss?
Those who see “race to the bottom” elements in Delaware’s dominance might
cheer. For those inclined to see Delaware as having won “a race to the top,” and
providing more efficient law than other states, the situation is more complicated.
On one hand, if Delaware’s market share were to decline, so would the network
benefits of Delaware incorporation. 283 On the other hand, if regulatory competition
is often salutary, as many race-to-the-top proponents believe, 284 stronger forum
competition might push Delaware to improve its law.
VII. CONCLUSION
For at least half a century the Delaware courts have been the de facto “national”
U.S. corporate law courts. Delaware law is a central part of the business law
curriculum in most major U.S. law schools. 285 The official comments
accompanying the Model Business Corporations Act (MBCA), a model law
followed by twenty-four states, 286 frequently refer to Delaware cases to provide
Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability: A Policy Analysis, 162 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 5 (2006).
282. See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text.
283. On the network benefits associated with Delaware incorporation, see Klausner
(1995), supra note 16, 843–47.
284. See, e.g., ROMANO (1993), supra note 15.
285. Simmons (2008), supra note 17, at 1173; WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN &
GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
xxiii (3d ed. 2009) (explaining the authors’ decision to focus on Delaware cases).
286. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANNOTATED xii (4th ed. 2008).
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examples to explain the drafters’ choices. 287 Courts in other states often cite and
follow Delaware case law when their own case law is sparse. Courts in MBCA
states sometimes cite Delaware jurisprudence in preference to decisions from other
MBCA states. 288
Given the Delaware courts’ dominance in writing leading corporate law
decisions, and given Delaware’s dominance as the incorporation locus for publicly
traded companies, one might expect Delaware to be the venue of choice for suits
under corporate law involving Delaware-incorporated firms. And so it once was,
but less so now. In this Article, we make this point by summarizing the evidence
we develop in a companion empirical article on Delaware’s loss of litigation market
share. We then explore the reasons for the out-of-Delaware trend, the steps the
Delaware judges or legislature, or Delaware companies, might take to reverse this
new trend and the implications of the trend for the quality of corporate law.
Delaware’s loss of litigation market share suggests that a delicate balancing act
engaged in by Delaware and its courts could be going awry. To attract
incorporations, Delaware must appeal to corporate managers without being so promanager as to disturb shareholders. In that effort, Delaware’s expert judges and
well-developed case law are major selling points. Yet Delaware needs continued
case flow to generate precedents on which the users of Delaware corporate law
depend. Plaintiffs’ attorneys, however, will only file suits in Delaware courts if
they expect better results in Delaware than elsewhere. Increasingly, they do not.
The principal reasons appear to include anti-plaintiff-lawyer rhetoric in some cases,
fee cuts for plaintiffs’ lawyers, the weakening of the custom which gave early filers
an edge in the battle for the lead counsel role and greater ease in obtaining
elsewhere expedited discovery.
It must be tempting for Delaware courts to take steps to recapture market share.
They are aware of the out-of-Delaware trend, as they have referred in a number of
recent rulings to the multi-jurisdictional “problem.” 289 Moreover, some of the
changes in Delaware law and practice that likely contributed to the trend could
probably be reversed without engendering strong opposition from corporate
managers. How the Delaware courts will respond, and how successful any response
will be, remains to be seen. Delaware firms could also respond by adopting forum
selection clauses. Some have done so but the enforceability of forum selection
provisions, particularly bylaws, is unclear. Moreover, if major institutional
shareholders either favor, or become troubled by, the out-of-Delaware trend, they
likely could influence where cases are filed. But major shareholders have thus far
been silent. Correspondingly, it is too soon to know whether the Delaware courts
can successfully rebalance their approach to litigation in order to regain litigation
market share without undermining Delaware’s success in attracting incorporations.

287. William B. Chandler III & Anthony A. Rickey, Manufacturing Mystery: A Response
to Professors Carney and Shepherd’s “The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success,”
2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 95, 113.
288. Id. at 114–15; Scott R. Haiber, Derogating the Derivative: Tandycrafts Inc. v. Initio
Partners and the Role of Attorneys’ Fees in Shareholder Litigation, 3 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 213,
242 (1990).
289. Micheletti & Parker (2012), supra note 10, at 27.
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The policy implications of the out-of-Delaware trend are unclear as well. The
market for incorporations works imperfectly, not least because incorporation
decisions are often made by self-interested managers, loosely policed by
shareholders. The shareholder litigation market surely works imperfectly as well,
not least because forum choices are often made by self-interested plaintiffs’
lawyers, often only loosely policed by shareholders. 290 Given these twin
imperfections, the social welfare effects of the out-of-Delaware trend are unclear.
Nevertheless, the trend has emerged as an important feature of U.S. corporate law
that will likely attract the attention of judges, lawyers, and academics for some
time.
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